The Present War.
James Dodson
SERMON IV.
With good advice make war. Prov. xx. 18.
THE principles of this proverb 1 have already stated and defended. To-day you expect the application. If the general doctrines laid down in the preceding discourse be admitted, we can proceed harmoniously in applying them to existing circumstances; but if the truth of these be disputed, we leave the case to your reflections, without urging our sentiments; well convinced of the difficulty of convincing men against their own inclinations. In order to refresh your recollection, and that you may judge fairly of the correctness of their application to the present war, I repeat the principles argued in the preceding sermon upon the same text.
WAR IS IN SOME CASES MORAL.
Reason and Revelation prove this.
WAR, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY, LIBERTY, AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND HONOUR, IS LAWFUL: AND DEFENSIVE WAR MAY BE FOR PRECAUTION, RESISTANCE, OR REDRESS.
Common Sense—Writers on Public Law—and the Word of God, prove this. The cases of Abram, Gideon, and David, furnish examples in illustration.
SUPPORT OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO A JUST WAR.
A sense of Justice—the love of Peace—and the Sacred Scriptures, prove this assertion. It is illustrated by the inspired Song of Deborah.
Should any of my hearers, anticipating the application which I would make of these principles to the American side of the present war, either express a doubt of their correctness, or deny their truth, I have not entirely lost my object. I take you at your option. However you may be disposed to consider your own country as the most guilty in the present contest, if you admit the principles which I have now repeated, the justice of this war upon our part will necessarily follow; and if you reject the general truths laid down, the superior injustice of the enemy will, in order to be consistent, be admitted by you. Take your choice; and let us reason together.
1. Do you deny the lawfulness of war in any case?
So let it be. I shall join with you for the time, in deprecating its numerous evils. It flows from the malevolent passions; and it encourages and strengthens the vicious passions from which it flows. It arrests the progress of improvement in society. It impoverishes countries; and lays waste the cities of the nations. It exposes to temptations, and corrupts the youth. It exposes to danger and to death. It hurries into eternity, in an unprepared state, thousands of our thoughtless fellow-sinners, who might otherwise have had time and space of repentance. If it be entirely unlawful, it must of course be the greatest of crimes which man commits against man: and the nation which wages war is guilty of a heinous offence against the moral Governor of the world. Upon your principles, war is a national crime; and the nation is guilty before God, and in your own estimation, in proportion to the magnitude of the offence. The greater the war, the greater the guilt. Piety too, abhors guilty nations. You, therefore, who consider war as a crime, will abhor nations in proportion to the extent of the wars in which they are concerned. Apply this. Blame your own country for her three years war. Set her down as guilty. Abhor her in due proportion. Lift up your voice against your rulers, who caused the nation to err, and are foremost in the crime. But what do you say of our foe? Great Britain is also at war with us. You say, war is unlawful; then, she too is guilty. Do you admit this? Her guilt is of older date. It is of greater extent. It is of longer duration. She is scarcely ever at peace. Her guilt, upon your own principles, surpasses the guilt of all the nations of the earth. During the last fifty years [i.e., prior to 1815], she has shed more blood in India than has been shed in Europe: and in all the wars of Europe she is a party. Do you then believe she is the most guilty nation upon earth? Say so. Let your conversation and your political opinions manifest that you are in earnest. Show, that it is the abhorrence of all war from a pure conscience, and not a political bias against this republican country, the least guilty of the crime of war, that induces you to reprobate the contest. Declare, unequivocally, that as all war is unjust; as the guilt is in proportion to the extent and duration of the criminality. Great Britain is guilty of the greatest national injustice. You cannot avoid this conclusion. You cannot avoid the charge of insincerity, if you do not readily adopt this conclusion. But I have not yet done with this subject. I will try you further by your own moral maxims. All war is crime—A nation is guilty in proportion to the scale upon which it sins by carrying on war. These are your maxims. Then you declare that the power of the British empire is founded in crime. War hath raised her to her present splendour. Behold her navy—what you call the instrument of her guilt. It is her support and her glory, it is that very navy too, which hath proved the cause of our war with her. If we are guilty for going to war; she at least was the tempter. It was her war—according to your maxim, her crime; it was her crime against other powers that affected our neutrality, and of course produced the rupture. She despoiled our trade; she took seamen from our peaceful vessels. She forced them to the service of sin; for you say war is sinful. Britain then, engaged with other nations in crime, sought occasion to force some of our people to take part in that crime. She committed a crime upon us. She is still guilty of the same crime. She continues at war. If, then, war is in all cases unjust, she is the most unjust. Examine your own hearts. Try, by your attachments, the degree of influence which your sentiments have over your inclinations; and most assuredly, you can no longer consider yourselves sincere, if opposed to all war, you yet remain the partisans of England in her strife with America. You will, if conscientious, speak and act in such a manner as to be above suspicion: and you will do me, I hope, the justice to acknowledge, that not my argument, but your own principle, holds up to the moral world the government of England as most worthy of Christian abhorrence.
2. You will, perhaps, admit, that defensive war is lawful, but deny my definition of it to be correct. Will you give us your own definition of defensive warfare? Will you exclude precaution and redress, and confine it to resistance upon your own soil against invasion? I am satisfied: not, indeed, with the correctness of your views, but with the sufficiency of your own admission to the object which I have in view—to convince you that Great Britain is still the more guilty nation. Let then the definition you have given, contrary as it is to all authority, be the one adopted in the present case. Resistance to an invading enemy is alone lawful war.
This is your definition. You will allow me again to urge the duty of consistency. Abide by the application of your own definition. Tell me then, when did England wage a lawful war? When was her soil invaded? Are her armies confined to her own soil? Is her fleet confined within the limits of her own waters? Was it within British seas she blockaded the ports of the nations, plundered our merchants, searched our vessels, and captivated our mariners? No, my friends. According to your views of lawful war, England is the disturber of the nations; and her crime is her glory. She is proud that her soil is in safety. She triumphs in the idea, that her armies have overrun the provinces of her enemy. She boasts of wielding the trident over the ocean, and in the ports of the several nations of the earth. By your definition, as the apologists of England, you may condemn as immoral the achievements of our Browns, and our Scotts, our Gaines, and our Porters—You may condemn the invasion of Canada by the American arms: but certainly, you have an equal degree of guilt to balance the account of criminality, between the belligerents, in the capture of Detroit, the invasion of Plattsburgh, the possession of Castine, the plunders of the Chesapeake, and of the cities which lie on its rivers, and its shores: and there is yet a vast portion of guilt to which there is no parallel. If it be unlawful to pass in Avar, the limits of our own country, you may blot from the number of your saints, the names of Abraham, and David, and Gideon: but you cannot justify that nation that has died in blood the snow? of Scandinavia, and the sands of the Ganges; that has kindled the flames of peaceful Copenhagen, and levelled to the dust the bulwarks of Seringapatam.
If it be unjust to wage war for the preservation of property, liberty, and national dignity or independence, I believe it will not be easy to find in the history of nations a justifiable war, or any nation so innocent of shedding blood as the United States of America. It is impossible to reason upon moral principles against the side of America in the present war, without exposing the immorality of the enemy. Every argument, that can apply, in any one case, against this country, will, with greater force, apply in many cases, to the other belligerent. Make the experiment, and you will feel the force of my assertion. In the books of the wars of England, no cause of battle which will bear examination can be found, if you reject as illegitimate those which have been mentioned. There is only one other conceivable cause. War may be waged in defense of religious rights in opposition to persecution. Of this cause, however. Great Britain in her wars cannot avail herself. The church of England is not suffering under persecution. She feels power; and however she may be charged by others with an intolerant spirit, she is under no necessity of contending by the sword for toleration for herself. There was a time when English men fought for their religious liberties. They contended against their own kings, his prelates, his counsellors, and his arms. They contended valiantly, and their valour deserves to be held in everlasting remembrance That day is past; and Alas! the descendants of the New-England pilgrims, the descendants of English and Scottish dissenters from prelatical usurpation, appear to have forgotten, in their admiration of the grandeur of British power, the mixture of superstition and misrule in the complex constitution of church and state in that land—the evil, of which their fathers complained, and under which they grievously suffered.
There are, in the British empire, both within and without her present ecclesiastical political establishment, men of virtue, of truth, of piety, who revere the memory of the Puritans, and who are themselves friends to the rights of humanity who strive to diffuse the light of Christianity among the nations; and avail themselves of the opportunities which even criminal conquest may offer for that purpose. But the wars of the sovereign are not for the defense of religion. They are political. It is not by the Royal family, the counsellors, the nobles, or the army, that British piety is supported. It is not for the honour of religion that the sacrament is prostituted; and that dissenters are excluded from power. It is not in support of the great Protestant cause, that Papists are kept down in Ireland, and raised up to all the splendour of their superstition in Italy, in Spain, and in France, by the arms of England. It is not for the sake of Christianity, in the most extensive use of that word, that a revenue accrues to the British government from the Pagan establishments of India. The wars, in short, of our enemy, wherever they are waged, are utterly illegitimate and unjust upon the principle of the definition which you have given, for the purpose of condemning, as unjust, that policy of your own government, which makes the provinces of the enemy, in some instances, the seat of the present war.
3. Do you give up the controversy about the nature of defensive warfare, and admit the justice of transferring it into the enemy’s territory, but still deny the applicability of the cases which I have stated from the Bible?
I meet you upon this ground with cheerfulness. It is Christian ground. Let the Bible direct our political conduct. Let this book decide upon the principles which we are to apply to the belligerent nations, in determining the measure of their rights and their wrongs. If I have misapplied its maxims, give your interpretation. I will adopt your own comment, and show you, that if its principles condemn the American policy, it will also condemn, with equal severity, and in more numerous instances, the moral character of British wars, for which you are an apologist against your country. You will again have an opportunity of examining, as a sincere Christian, your own heart, and of trying, before your God, your scruples relative to the present war. You can then determine, whether they arise from tenderness of conscience, or from the prejudices of foreign partialities.
Offer your objections to the proof I have adduced from the Bible. Do you say the cases are not parallel? I grant it. The wars of Palestine differ in many things from the American war. Palestine itself differs from these lands which we occupy. The people too are in many things different from us. And yet, there are also many things in which their circumstances agree. But to gratify you, I drop all pretensions to maintain the parallel. I have cited the cases of Abram, Gideon, and David. I have stated facts. These facts are not disputed. Upon the facts, I have rested principles. These principles may be applied. It is not in order to amuse you with expert analogies, in order to run a parallel, that I have opened the Bible. It is for the purpose of exhibiting principles, and the facts which support and explain them. The principles being discovered, every man may judge of the application. Do you deny these principles? War is lawful—defensive war is lawful—to prevent, resist, or repair an injury, is lawful—war may be waged for the defense of liberty, property, and national independence, if any of these are either threatened or violated. Do you deny these principles? No; you have admitted them. I will, therefore, apply them to
THE WAR IN WHICH OUR COUNTRY IS AT PRESENT ENGAGED.
In mailing this application of the words of inspiration, “With good advice make war,” I design to show, that The United States have lawful cause of war with Great Britain, and to explain The principles upon which the war should be prosecuted.
I. The Causes of the present war.
Whatever may have been the personal wishes or opinions of those who recommended to the congress a declaration of hostilities, the instrument itself, in which the declaration is made, and the Report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, assert facts, and contain reasonings, too true to afford the impartial reader an opportunity of denying, upon moral principles, the legitimacy of an appeal to the sword. That in the recommendation of war, and in the ultimate decision, some of the men in power may have been influenced by personal irritation—others, by views of ambition and self-interest—and others, by fear of giving offence to patrons, or to constituents, I do not take upon me to deny or to affirm. Such motives, in some degree, enter very generally into the reasonings and conduct of all men, and particularly of politicians; but even then there may exist a love of country, and a sense of justice, modifying the less worthy motives. With the private designs of individuals, we have not in this inquiry so much to do as with matters of fact, which are of public notoriety. God judges the heart: but, it is known to the world, that for a series of years, the British sovereign was in the habit of injuring the interests and honour of this commonwealth. Whatever diversity of opinions may exist respecting the extent of the injury; and although the expediency and justice of the war, at its commencement, may have been called in question, no man ever doubted that the application of the rule of the war of 1756, the orders in council, and the numerous blockading decrees of that nation, were injurious to the fair trade of America. The practice, too, of searching our vessels by their men of war, in order to impress our peaceful sailors into their service, as the fact has never been doubted, will be universally admitted to be a grievance—a heavy grievance to any people, and much more so to a free and independent empire.
There are two principles, Christians, upon which you will express your accord. Whether the guilt of provoking the war, or of commencing it, be the greater, you will admit, both, that THE SIN, FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF WHICH IT IS PERMITTED BY THE DEITY, is chargeable upon us all; and THAT THE CAUSE OF THE CONTINUANCE OF HOSTILITIES, is different from that which gave it origin. If I shall have succeeded in proving that the original grounds of the declaration of war were moral, there can be no doubt of the propriety now of resisting an invading foe, or of continuing the contest until it terminate in an equitable peace. I do not rest my argument entirely upon the limited idea of defense, which is involved in resisting invasion, although in the present stage of the contest, this would suffice to prove its justice. He is unworthy of being treated with an appeal to intellect or conscience, who would dispute, after admitting the lawfulness of war in any case, the propriety of repelling, force by force, when a cession of territory is demanded at the point of the bayonet, and invasion with all its horrors approaches his own door.
I affirm the justice of the war from its commencement. Our neutral trade was violently opposed, and almost totally destroyed; our property was captured; our fellow-citizens were enslaved, while peaceably pursuing their proper employment; and negotiation failed, after the exertion of years, to procure redress for the past, or immunity for the future. To recover and preserve property—To redeem and to defend men, these are lawful causes of war. These are the causes of the present war. The argument requires neither art nor eloquence. It is obvious to every capacity. It is irresistible. It may be evaded, but it cannot be refuted. If it fail in extorting confession, it cannot fail in producing conviction.
American property has been seized and destroyed: American citizens have been impressed and enslaved. These are the facts.
War, in defense of property, of liberty, and of life, is lawful. This is the principle.
Apply the principle to the facts. The United States have declared war, in order to vindicate the rights of property, of liberty, and of life. Therefore is the present war, from its origin, a defensive and a just war. This is the argument.
You may speak about it, and write about it; you may close your eyes upon it; you may go round about, and fly from it: but you will in vain offer resistance to its truth. The facts are notorious. The principle is confessed. The application is necessary.
I use very plain language, my brethren; it is time to speak plainly upon this subject. Our country has suffered abundantly. Insult has been added to injury, by a people who regard the American republic with an evil and a jealous eye. They consider this country as a commercial rival. They are alarmed at its rapid growth in arts, in knowledge, in opulence, and in power. They affect to despise everything that is American. By their publications, in prose and in poetry, the English writers strive to keep their countrymen in ignorance of the land in which we live. They draw a caricature of our manners, our morals, our laws, and our religion. Their official reports, those documents in which the veracity of history should uniformly be found, are characterized by illiberality and misrepresentation. In diplomacy, they have practiced delay; they have trifled, equivocated, and insulted. They have sought the glory of Great Britain, at the expense of the United States; they have endeavoured to divide and to destroy. The hatred which they bear to our republican institutions, envenoms the spirit of rivalry, with which they contemplate the progress of empire in the new world. Resistance ought to have been made long before it was attempted by this nation—It ought to have been made with unanimity and energy.
In vindicating the justness of this war, upon the part of the United States, there is one interesting question, to which I think it my duty to turn your particular attention. It is one of the principal causes of the war, that British officers have, while acting upon the right of search, impressed mariners from American merchantmen. This outrage upon the national independence, they have endeavoured to justify. The practice was convenient and profitable for the navy of that country; and they sought for a doctrine which might serve to give to it a semblance of equity. They strove to discover some general principle, which might at the same time gratify the national pride of England, and furnish a source of allegation and dispute, among the political parties existing in the United States. They found such a maxim in the despotic tenet of perpetual allegiance to the crown. This maxim, never admitted by any writer upon public law, who has a regard to character, or is worthy of a name, is no less false in itself, than inapplicable to the case in hand. Were it even true, that a native of Britain can never of right throw off his allegiance to the country which gave him birth, it by no means follows that the king has a right to take from his employments, any of his subjects, to serve him against his own choice.
1. He has not this right in his own dominions; and much less can he procure it, by violating the territory of a neighbouring nation. If he have no right to enter a private farmer’s house in England, and force the son away from his father, and his mother, into slavery; certainly he has no right, by virtue of native allegiance, to force such a one away from any other lawful situation in which he may happen in providence to be placed.
2. If the doctrine of perpetual allegiance were true, it would not justify entering by force, and committing violence on board an American vessel. The right of search, for enemy’s goods, or contraband of war, aboard a neutral, is tolerated, for the purpose of maintaining a fair trade; but it has no connection with the violent and injurious practice, of dragging men into bondage, when prosecuting a fair trade.
3. As perpetual allegiance gives no right of enslaving an English subject, by forcing him into a service which is not his choice; much less can it justify the impressment of an American citizen. Urge, as you will, the similarity of countenance, of dress, and of language; and the difficulty of distinguishing man from man: these remarks go only to show the propriety of omitting as inexpedient, the practice which is so liable to abuse, even if it were lawful; but, on no principle of sound reasoning, can it afford any right whatever, to seize by force the person of a free man.[1] It was reserved for the boasted wisdom of British partisans, to discover the argument, that an American deserved the punishment of impressment, into the naval service of the haughty empire, (whose cruel yoke had formerly been thrown off,) for no other crime than his resemblance to an Englishman. Does this denote servitude?
4. The pretext of perpetual allegiance, can have no effect, in giving the semblance of equity to the practice, in the extent to which it has been carried by the officers of the British crown. They have claimed the right of removing from the vessels, aboard of which they entered by formal contract, men of all nations, who could not possibly be mistaken for natives of the British Isles. The Swede, the Dane, the Dutchman, the Spaniard, and the sable sons of Africa, have been ordered, under the lash, to quit the place of their choice, and enter aboard a man of war. Such are the outrageous acts which the plea of perpetual allegiance has been invented to cover. It has been repeated, and repeated, and repeated, until weak men, in despite of its absurdity, have been tempted to believe its truth.
Having shown its inapplicability, I go on to prove its erroneousness.
The question to which I particularly request your attention, is,
THE RIGHT OF EXPATRIATION.
The defense of property is one cause of this war. The defense of persons is another. Both are legitimate causes. The seizure of men by the naval officers of England, took place under the plea of allegiance, which I have shown to be inapplicable. I undertake, besides, to prove that it is unjust. In taking this ground, I am not ignorant of the opposition made to the right of expatriation. I am prepared to meet it in all its force. The question has been discussed in Europe and America. The sailor and the soldier, the advocate and the judge, the lawgiver and the philosopher, the husbandman and the merchant, the mechanic and the courtier, the divine and the statesman, have taken an interest in the discussion. The decision affects all classes of men, and all the nations of the earth. It behooves especially, the Christian moralist, to know upon which side the truth is found, in order to be able to acquit himself with a good conscience, wheresoever it may be his lot to reside. If allegiance to human governments be indeed unalienable, he who leaves his native country, never can enjoy the rights of a citizen in any other land; and, although the men of the world may sport with perjury, the Christian, desirous to act as an Israelite indeed in whom there is no guile, can never, by his profession or his oath, undertake to transfer an allegiance which is in its nature unalterable. Pitiable indeed, is his case; bound by an iron law to the spot which gave him birth, or prevented, if he should venture to leave his first residence, from enjoying to the end of his life the privilege of a freeman in any other society upon earth. In vindicating the right of expatriation, I feel convinced I am on the side of humanity and godliness.
All men are born equally free—There is no obligation by contract to prevent entirely a change of country—allegiance and protection are reciprocal—all nations recognize the principle of expatriation—the contrary doctrine leads to absurdity—and the word of the living God secures this right to man.
These are my arguments in defense of my assertion. I proceed to illustrate and apply them.
1. All Men are born equally Free.
The religion, which is from God, lays the loftiness of man, the pride of royalty, and the claims of noble blood, in the dust. It assures us that God hath made of one blood all the nations of men for to dwell upon all the face of the earth [Acts xvii. 26.]—that all are by nature in a like sinful and dependent state. There is nothing in the bone, or the blood, or the head, or the heart of a king’s son, to distinguish him from the infant peasant. There is no provision in nature or religion, for binding one man against his will to the service of another. Nativity, therefore, of itself, produces neither sovereignty nor allegiance: and it is of course but a violence against the laws of nature and of revelation to urge, on account of birth, a perpetual allegiance to any dynasty whatever. The relation of rulers and ruled exists only by contract. Society results from the constitution of human nature. It is the will of God that order should obtain among his rational creatures: but every man is free to select his own society, and make choice of the power to which he will submit for his protection.
2. There is no obligation from the social compact upon man to continue in allegiance to the government under which he was born.
That an individual may bind himself, by express stipulation, to certain services, in a given place, either for a specified term of years, or for life, is not denied; but such stipulation is not implied in the social compact. A nation, it is true, as well as any other body politic, may give pledges, and contract debts; and every member of the body is bound to redeem the pledge, and discharge the obligation, in its true spirit and design: but no man is bound to continue a member, longer than the nature of the connection itself requires. There is not in the constitution of the body politic any such regulation, as requires every man to abide in the country which gave him birth. It is not necessary to civil society, that such a principle should be recognized: it is not proper that it should: and even if the government should succeed in introducing it expressly into the constitution, the stipulation, as it would be immoral, could not be obligatory. Seeing no man is morally bound to the spot in which he was born, and cannot lawfully be circumscribed by the limits of a prison, however extended, unless by transgression he has forfeited his liberty, it is perfectly preposterous to allege that a government, formed for a local jurisdiction, should claim, without his consent, the right of sovereignty over him, after having passed beyond the limits of its authority.
3. Allegiance and protection are reciprocal; and protection is the foundation upon which the claim of allegiance rests. When the foundation is removed, the edifice falls of course.
I readily admit, that there is something in the idea of native country, which is intimately connected with the doctrine of allegiance. It is not, however, the spot of earth, upon which the child is born, that connects him with the national society; but the relation of the child’s parents to that society.
In the ordinary concerns of life there is no need of such minute distinctions; and there is too little discrimination, exercised by the greater part of men, to be able to understand it. Even statesmen are not always wise; and designing men find it their interest to keep up a confusion of ideas upon important subjects. In the present discussion, nevertheless, it is necessary, that I distinctly state to you the true bond, which connects the child with the body politic. It is not the inanimate matter of a piece of land, but the moral relations of his parentage. Let a child be born within the walls of a church, this does not make him a church member; but if the parent or parents be in connection with the church, so is the offspring. Visible society, as it is provided for in the constitution of human nature, naturally seeks to perpetuate its own existence, by conferring upon children the membership of their parents. Each citizen too is supposed to reserve for his offspring the benefits of society. The Governor of the universe approves of this provision. Thus it is, that the country of the father is that of the child, and not because he happened to be born in its territory. Residence produces an attachment. Education cherishes affection for the scenes of early life; but only moral relations lay the foundation for moral obligation. It is the enjoyment of the privileges of society, that lays the foundation for obedience to its authority. It follows from this, that protection being the end of civil government, the sovereign has no other claim upon the allegiance of the subject, than what arises from the protection which he affords. As is the protection which I ask and receive, so is the fealty which I owe. If I ask none, I am under no allegiance: If I receive none, I have nothing to return. It is the very essence of despotism to claim authority over me without an equivalent.[2]
4. All Nations recognize the Right of Expatriation.
It has been very common, among the several nations of the earth, to banish from their territories into other countries, some of their citizens—Writers on public law, admit the right of emigration—Foreigners are naturalized by the several civilized states; and each of these facts implies the principle of expatriation.
The history of distinguished men, in the first ranks of life, who have been exiled from the Grecian states, from the Roman republic, from France, Germany, and from the British dominions, would fill volumes of instructive comment on this theme of discussion. We have very respectable exiles before us, in this city, who are living witnesses of the truth, that Great Britain, notwithstanding the claims of perpetual allegiance upon the part of her statesmen, admits the dissolution of native allegiance, and of course contradicts the doctrine of its perpetuity. If nativity simply constitutes allegiance, it must be unalterable; because native country never can change: a man is born but once. If voluntary contract is the basis of allegiance, I have gained my point; for, in this case, the one party is free to relinquish a connection in the nature of things conditional, as well as the other. When the connection is dissolved, protection and allegiance perish together.
I give you the law of nations on this subject, in the words of Vattel. “The term country, commonly signifies the state of which one is a member. In a more confined sense, and more agreeable to its etymology, this term signifies the state, or even more particularly the town, or place where our parents lived at the moment of our birth. In this sense it is justly said, that our country cannot be changed, and always remains the same, to whatsoever place we remove afterwards—But, as several lawful reasons may oblige a man to choose another country, that is, to become a member of another society; so, when we speak in general of the duty to our country, we ought to understand by this term, the state of which a man is an actual member; since it is to that he owes it entirely, and in preference to all others.” [Book I. Chap. 11.]
“There are cases, in which a citizen has an absolute right to renounce his country, and abandon it entirely. 1. If the citizen cannot procure subsistence in his own country. 2. If the body of the society, or he who represents it, absolutely neglects to fulfil his obligations to a citizen. 3. If the sovereign would establish laws, to which the pact of Society cannot oblige a citizen to submit.” [Book I. Chap. 19.]
Of the third justifiable cause of expatriation, M. de Vattel gives three instances—When religious liberty is violated; when a form of government is altered from freedom to a more arbitrary system; and when a nation has given up, by submission to another, its own independence. “Those who quit their country from a lawful reason, are called emigrants;” and of “the right of emigration,” he says in the next sentence, [Sect. 225.] “This is a NATURAL RIGHT, which is certainly excepted in the pact of society.” It is, by the law of nations, a right which cannot be surrendered.
Proceeding upon this principle, all nations have been in the habits of naturalizing foreigners resident among them.[3] England particularly, as if determined to make apparent to the universe her own inconsistency, has furnished peculiar facilities for naturalizing seafaring men of all nations. The short period of two years serving aboard British vessels; marriage with a native in her ports; and voluntary enlistment aboard her men of war, form a sufficient ground for claiming them as subjects. The sovereign of Britain, while he denounces as a traitor, every native of his empire found in arms against him, forces to fight against his own country, the native of whatever nation; and, as if determined to claim, what is most unreasonable and tyrannical, within the compass of human thought, he compels to the battle in the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, American emigrants naturalized, even since the declaration of the present war. The plain language of English royal proclamations, illustrated by the practice of British officers, is, “all the states upon earth must allow emigrations to Britain, but must prohibit emigrations from Britain to them: the natives of our own soil, and those of other countries, whom we naturalize, shall be our slaves forever; but let no other commonwealth dare to protect a naturalized foreigner.”[4]
5 The Right of Expatriation appears from the absurdity of the doctrine of perpetual fealty to the place of nativity.
In the decision of this question, every man of piety has an interest. However few the men who reason, in order that they may understand; and examine moral subjects, in order that they may discharge their duty, there are still some, I trust, who would rather suffer on the spot which gave them birth, than leave it forever, if by so doing they must violate the laws of morality, and sin against their God.
Upon the principle which I am opposing, sad, sad indeed, would be the condition of man. The child is pinned down in the place of his nativity as in a prison; and, unto its local authorities he is forever in thralldom. The African and the Hindoo dare not leave his country for another. The Frenchman and the Spaniard must never throw off allegiance to Louis and to Ferdinand. To the Prince Regent of England, the emigrant must continue in subjection, although he, in an unhappy hour, has perjured himself, in disclaiming his authority, and becoming a naturalized citizen of this republic. And by the same rule of obligation to the place of birth, the authorities of Connecticut extend to many citizens of New-York; the local jurisdiction of every corporation of a city or a village perpetually binds everyone born within their respective limits. According to this morality, my hearers, you are guilty of transgression, for having left the township in which you drew the first breath; and in order to avoid further guilt, you must return whence you came, and leave behind you the wives and the children you have gotten in this city; for here they must remain until they retire to the tomb. You must, instead of encouraging a free and honourable intercourse among men of all nations and kingdoms, in order to make them live as one great rational family of the same blood: instead of encouraging a rivalship in equity and honour among the nations, and a spirit of personal freedom and generous feeling among the natives of every clime and kindred—instead of this, you must require that man be chained to his birth-place; that sullenness, and non-intercourse, and jealousy, and hatred, be cherished; and that society be cut up into minute sections, with feelings and with views graduated upon the puny scale of counties and of townships. Then will Aristocracy perpetuate her dominion, and Despotism horribly smile from her bloody but triumphant car.
The absurdity of this doctrine is so obvious to the Christian, that I am astonished to find among the professed followers of my Redeemer any of its advocates. The man who inculcates perpetual allegiance to the place of birth, assuredly calculates largely upon the amount of human ignorance and folly; he ventures far upon the slavish feelings of his partisans, but lie does little credit to his own discernment or benevolence. 1 cannot but infer, that God has bestowed a scanty supply of brains upon the man that denies the right of expatriation; unless indeed by a course of uncommon depravity, he has himself destroyed the finer fibres of the heart. Far different from his, is the morality of the Christian religion.
6. With the scriptural argument, I close my defense of a man’s right to choose his country.
The scriptures inform us, that God gave the earth to the children of men. It was his will and command, that it should be peopled from one pair. God said unto them, be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth. [Gen. i. 28.] But this order could not be executed, unless the children should emigrate from the place of their nativity, settle in other countries, and form new societies. There is, moreover, no provision made in the scriptures, for keeping the colonies in perpetual subjection to the parent state. This would make the whole world subject to one unwieldy despotism. Upon the contrary, we are assured, that when religion prevails over all the earth, there shall still be distinct nations, which Satan shall deceive no more; [Rev. xx. 3.] there shall still be distinct kingdoms—even the kingdoms of this world, that shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and his Christ. In conformity to this principle, the Governor of the universe, at an early age, when men formed the plan of adhering together in one great and corrupt society, performed a miracle to prevent the evil; and, so the Lord scattered them abroad from thence, upon the face of all the earth. [Gen. xi. 8.] Instead of permitting the sovereign of every country, to deceive the subject with claims of perpetual allegiance, God commanded Abram to expatriate himself. The father of the faithful obeyed, and left his native country. In vain would the kings of the Canaanites claim, as bound to serve them, the descendants of Abram, born in their territories. Jacob removed with his family to Egypt; and even there, notwithstanding the power of the monarchy, they claimed the right of being considered as a distinct people, and of emigrating at their pleasure from the land of bondage. The proclamations of the Prince of Britain would have passed for morality at the court of Pharaoh; but Moses, without fearing the wrath of the king, said unto him. Let my people go. [Exod. v. 1, &c.] The tyrant ultimately suffered the punishment of his crimes, when he attempted to reclaim, as native subjects, the Israelitish emigrants. Pharaoh, and his host, his chosen captains also, were drowned in the Red Sea.
Moses did not offend the laws of morality, although in despite of native allegiance, he invited Hobab to expatriate himself from Midian, and accept of naturalization in the commonwealth of Israel. Come thou with us, and we will do thee good—Leave us not, I pray thee—and it shall he, if thou go with us, that what goodness the Lord shall do unto us, the same will we do unto thee. [Numb. x. 29—32.]
I will not pursue this discussion further. I trust I have already sufficiently vindicated the principle upon which, I myself, in common with many of my hearers, and of my fellow-citizens in New-York, have acted. The principle upon which, the ministers of religion must, in many instances act, in conformity to the command of the Prince of the kings of the earth. Go ye into all nations—preach the gospel to every creature; and lo, I am with you, even unto the end of the world—THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPATRIATION.
There are, I feel and acknowledge, many tender ties to bind us to our native country. We cherish, in fond recollection, the scenes and the partners of our youthful days. We revere the land of our fathers, and the place of their sepulchres. We look back on the friends that we have left behind: we desire their welfare: we cultivate their correspondence; and we are not ashamed to call them brethren. If we have left the national society, and have thrown off allegiance to their rulers, we count it no dishonour to have been born in a territory, where arts, and science, and literature, and heroism, and patriotism, abound. Even now, I can gladly transport myself on fancy’s wings to my native hills. I would still listen to the music of the lark, to the bleating of the flocks, and to the reaper’s song; and I would close the day, in the bosom of a peaceful family, with a solemn hymn of thanksgiving to the Lord. I would still gaze on the lofty rock, where the eagle builds her nest; admire at a distance, the cloud-capt cliffs of Benmore, and count the foaming billows of the Atlantic, rolling among the basaltic pillars of Staffa, along the classic shores of Iona, [Icolmkill.] to the bold promontories at the mouth of Lochlevan. I bless my native country, and take pride in all the excellency of her sons. Others too, feel towards their native place, as I do. But yet, my brethren, on a question of morality, truth must decide. Conscience, and not fancy, must make the application of God’s law.
I have frequently felt surprise, at the influence of national feelings over the moral principles of men of talents and of virtue. Some men of that description, men too, of quick sensibility, of high and honourable feelings, have been seen listening to discussions, which, in denying the right of transferring allegiance, charged themselves with perjury. For, if fealty be unalterable, the oath of naturalization is a falsehood. There is one remarkable part of the character of the sons of Britain, which is worthy of imitation by the children of Columbia. It is their attachment to country. It is often extravagant in the former, and it is misplaced when directed to the society which they have left, more than to that of which they have become members; and especially, when it embraces the guilty crown of the kingdom: but it is in itself an honourable principle: alas! it is too feeble, in the hearts of those American citizens, who admire the moral order and political machinery of Great Britain, more than they seek to preserve the integrity of their own republican institutions.
I have not made these remarks on misplaced attachment to country, with a view to apply them to those emigrants from the dominions of the British king, who belong to this congregation. No. To you, my brethren, they are not applicable. In common with those Christians in your native country, and in this, the country of your choice, who are bound with you in the same faith, and in the same covenant, you embrace, as a part of your Christian doctrine, the principle of expatriation. You disclaim, by the solemnities of religion, allegiance to the corrupt, political, and ecclesiastical system of British misrule. That was your country. It is so no more. To our brethren; yea, to every man in that empire, we wish health, and happiness, and eternal life. But this country, although we see and lament the evils which appertain to its inhabitants and to its government, this country, is now become our own. Here we have voluntarily settled. Here we have married our wives. Here we have our homes. Here we have our children placed as olive-plants around our table; and here we expect to leave our flesh to rest in hope, when the last breath shall depart from our nostrils, and the spirit shall return to God. To this country, during the present struggle to maintain the rights of expatriation, to preserve the rights of the stranger, who expects not in vain to find hospitality—To this country, we wish success in the present contest. We pray for a happy termination of the strife, and for a speedy restoration of the blessings of peace, that in the peace thereof we may have peace.
Having thus vindicated the most doubtful part of the cause of America in the present war, and given evidence of its justness, I go on,
II. To show the Principles upon which the War may he lawfully prosecuted.
Besides the question of right to make war upon an offending nation, there are many considerations to be taken into the account of its moral character. Governments, as well as individuals, have not unfrequently displayed pride, indiscretion, and malevolence, in contending for their unquestionable rights; and have thereby given a character of inexpediency and criminality to a contest which might have been conducted by better men upon moral principles. Nor is the fact to be concealed, that the virtuous part of a community are justified in the sight of God and their country, in keeping aloof from a contest, however good the cause, if moral evil be made essential to the mode of carrying it on. We must not do evil that good may come of it. If the terms, upon which admission into the army, like the British sacramental test, [See page 71.] be absolutely sinful, it becomes a duty, even when the cause of war is just, to reject the terms, and of course to withhold a support which cannot otherwise be afforded.
It is evidently, therefore, both the duty and the interest of those who are placed at the head of a nation, to take order, that the wars, which, by the injustice of others, they are compelled to wage, be prosecuted upon equitable principles. If it should be the lot of a conscientious man to live in a belligerent state, which wages a war, just in its causes, but iniquitous in the mode by which it is conducted, he has only, when the evil is beyond his remedy, to withhold his personal agency, and to pray that the cause may, notwithstanding the sins of men, be prospered by the Lord. No iniquity of the instrument can justify the dereliction of a good cause. Those, of course, cannot be esteemed as virtuous members of any community, who, under the plea of improvidence, of weakness, or mismanagement, upon the part of rulers, not only strive to prevent the success of a lawful war, but also, with design to increase the national embarrassment, deny the justness of the contest. With this distinction, obvious to every man, I shield, from the charge of insincerity, those conscientious men who may disapprove of the present administration and the conduct of the war, while I make no apology for him, who, devoid of patriotism and virtue, calls in question the legitimacy of the contest as it now exists, and recommends submission to the enemy—I make no apology for him, who strives to prevent the success of his country in the present strife. I leave him to the comforts of his own reflections, knowing, as I do, that whatever may be his motives, they cannot command the approbation of his country, of his cotemporaries in other lands, of posterity, of his conscience, or of his God. With him, therefore, I do not stoop to argue the question. To others I say, let us examine, upon moral principles, the mode of prosecuting the present war.
I am not the eulogist of men in power; neither do I give flattering titles to man: I love the country of my choice, and I pray to God for the prosperity and success of its arms. I lament whatever of indecision, and imbecility, and improvidence, and mismanagement, has appeared in the halls of legislation, in the executive councils, in the leaders of our armies. I could fervently wish, and devoutly pray, for more firmness, and wisdom, and action, and for more extensive resources in men and in money for the safety of the nation. But 1 would not dispute, and embarrass, and threaten, for the purpose of producing an effect, for which I should afterwards blame those who were irresolute enough to listen to my opposition. I would not strive to bring about an evil for the sake of condemning it, and injuring the country. I would not tempt to sin, for the sake of triumphing over the fallen.
I submit to your consideration the three following principles; belligerent communities are always to be considered, each as one body—in war, the nation, as such, is the proper object of attack—the change, which humanity has already introduced into the modes of warfare, should not be diminished, but extended.
I shall now explain these principles, and apply them to the mode in which this war is conducted.
1. In a state of War, we must consider each Community as one Body.
However extensive an empire, however numerous its colonies and dependencies, organized into one society, and subject to the same sovereign power, when that sovereign has undertaken war, the whole empire is called upon to bear a part in its prosecution, and the other party in the contest, has a right to consider it as one body. In a just war, the place of attack is a question of expediency: and the most vulnerable point presents itself as the most eligible. [See pages 126, and 132.] The skill of the general in battle is displayed, in arranging his forces, and in selecting the point of attack, so as with the least exertion and danger to do the greatest possible injury to the hostile battalions. If he besieges a city, he will select the most vulnerable spot, and there strike the blow. It is worse than trifling to allege, that this is pusillanimous or immoral. The sole object of a just war is to make the enemy feel the evils of his own injustice, and by his sufferings dispose him to amend his ways. He must therefore be attacked upon the most accessible quarter.
I have already established the justness of the present war. Taking that for granted, I now inquire into the best manner of giving it effect. The circumstances of the case leave no manner of doubt upon this subject. Great Britain, separated from us by the wide Atlantic, exposes no point, upon which the United States can reach her, except her colonies and her shipping. The Canadas and her commerce present the proper objects of attack. On both these points she feels; and you may judge of her feelings from the fact, that those who feel with her, and for her, among ourselves, feel most upon these very subjects. Her fleets and her armies, those instruments of annoyance to others, are of no use but the protection of her colonies and commerce. By attacking and conquering them, the citizens of America may acquire, and have acquired, renown; but it is by capturing that which they protect, and for which alone they are supported, that the enemy can be brought to feel, to reason, and do justice.
Upper Canada, particularly, presented to the United States the most eligible theatre for the contest. It was the most accessible part of the enemy’s territory,—the possession of it would prove the defense of an extended frontier from the ravages of the foe, and from Indian barbarity—and it might be held as an equivalent until, for the sake of its restoration, the enemy would be constrained to do justice. These considerations put the policy of attacking it beyond a doubt. And the equity of it necessarily follows from the justness of the war itself. Do you doubt this? Show me wherefore, and I will answer you. Set your arguments in array, and my reply is at hand. “The inhabitants of Canada have committed no offence.” Is this your argument? Who then has offended? The Soldier, the Sailor? No. The Minister, the Regent? Will you then dispatch a messenger of private vengeance to assassinate the offending sovereign, rather than attack his dominions, and his colonies, and his troops, and his ships of war? But you are mistaken. The Canadians have offended. They have made a common cause with their sovereign. In him who represents them they have offended. Let them peacefully distinguish themselves from him, and remain as non-combatants in the possession and use of their property—and these innocents shall then be unmolested. It is not against the unoffending Canadians, it is against the king’s troops, and the king’s fleet, and against the king’s territories, that the United States wage this war on the waters and the shores of Erie, Champlain, and Ontario. And you, too, I suspect, from the nature of your remark, do not so much dispute the legitimacy of this part of the war, as you dislike the whole cause. Sympathy with the Canadians has frequently been affected as a benevolent method of aiming a side-blow at the administration of the government. This may be considered as good policy; but it partakes not of the candour of religion. The British empire, like the human body, has many members, and all the members being many, are one body. In a state of war, an attack upon any member is lawful. In a moral point of view, it makes no difference whether the blow falls upon the capitol or the colony. The whole nation is one body.
2. The Nation only is the proper Object of War.
Humanity prescribes laws for belligerent communities. The evils of war are necessarily great; and they ought not to be unnecessarily increased. Private persons and property, whose injury cannot affect the controversy, should remain unmolested. The monuments of the fine arts are respected by civilized nations; and none but barbarians will designedly destroy elegant edifices or libraries. The plunder of hamlets and villages, the conflagration of private dwellings and barns, can have no other effect than multiplying private misery, and producing higher degrees of exasperation; for the rule of humanity, in a necessary war, is to inflict no injury except what will affect the nation as a body politic, and thus subserve the proper end of warfare.
3. Several changes favourable to humanity, on the mode of conducting war, have already obtained; and such ought to be extended.
It is highly honourable to the government of this republic, that a proffer has been made to the enemy of an armistice, ever since the commencement of hostilities, upon condition that he should desist, by sea and by land, from the practices which called for an appeal to the sword; and that a proposal has been made, upon terms of reciprocity, for repaying to injured individuals the losses which might by them be incurred during the continuance of the contest. It is equally dishonourable, on the part of the foe, to refuse acceding to such proposals. On him of course descends the guilt of every injury.
According to modern usage in Christian nations, unauthorized individuals are not permitted with impunity to fall upon an enemy. Secret means of annoyance, such as poison and assassination, are discarded. The persons of those who do not carry arms, and even of retainers to an army, are in safety. Prisoners are not enslaved, but treated with respect. Officers are dismissed on their parole. Predatory excursions, and pillage of every kind, are discountenanced; and the horrors of war accordingly mitigated.[5] This reform has been effected principally through the influence of the Christian religion: a religion distinguished by its harmony with the most correct principles of national law. It ought to be extended in its benign influence to other practices, still admitted by the law of nations; but highly injurious to morality. It ought to be extended to the practice of privateering, and to that which gives origin to privateering; the practice of capturing private property of any kind upon the ocean, by public armed vessels, whether in peace or in war. There are many cogent reasons for opposing the practice of taking private property on the high seas. It is contrary to the golden rule, “do unto others as you would that they should do unto you.” It is robbing men of the fruits of their industry; for it allows them no equivalent for their property. It cherishes avarice, already sufficiently stimulated by commercial cupidity. It entirely destroys much property, without advantage to anyone. It endangers and sacrifices many valuable lives. It retards the progress of civilization. It increases the burden and expenditure of nations, by giving occasion for fleets of armed vessels, for defense and pillage. It is in the present condition of the world, the principal source of dispute and strife, of national quarrels, and of public wars. Therefore is it devoutly to be wished, that pious men, in every country, should, with one consent, set their faces against so great an evil; and support, with every exertion in their power, those able civilians among the nations, who are endeavouring, on this very head, to meliorate the code of public law.[6] The only ground upon which I justify this country in pursuing this practice, is that of visiting upon the enemy, the evil which his injustice merits. That ground is sufficient. It is the ground upon which rests the equity of the war itself. War under the best form is an evil—a necessary evil. Non enim est ulla defensio contra vim unquam optanda, sed nonnunquam est necessaria. [For even force in one’s own defense is never desirable, though it is sometimes necessary.] [Cicero.]
CONCLUSION.
I NOW bring this discourse to a close, with a summary of my reasons, for urging upon all classes, a cordial support of the defensive measures, which may be morally and constitutionally employed, by those, who, in divine providence, have the management of the war committed into their hands. If any means proposed, should appear to be unconstitutional, let those, who are friendly to the instrument which binds these states together in one great republican confederation, expose their inconsistency by liberal arguments; but let them still support their country in the contest. If any of these measures should be immoral, let Christians avoid touching, tasting, or handling the unclean thing; but let them still love their country; and in everything consistent with a good conscience sanctified by the Lord, promote the cause in which the nation is embarked against a powerful and unjust enemy.
If negotiation should fail to secure a speedy peace, the dangers of the country call for unanimity in the strife of blood and battle. In that case, supporting the war will be the means of preserving the union of the states: and this is unquestionably desirable. Whatever mistaken individuals may say of the collision of interests, and the rivalry existing between the north and the south, the east and the west; every state, every part of this extensive empire, has a deep interest in perpetuating the federal connection. It is the means of preventing those collisions and jealousies from coming to an open rupture—it is the means of internal peace and friendship—it is the means of promoting their commerce, their manufactures, and their agriculture—it is the means of cultivating, by suitable encouragement, the sciences and the liberal arts—it is the means of preserving unimpaired the liberties of the people, and guaranteeing the forms of their democratic policy—it is the means of defense against foreign enemies, waiting to divide, and anxious to destroy—it is the means of securing religious liberty, together with the purity, the peace, and the growth of our churches. The several religious denominations, already weakened by dissention, would become still more weak, if the parts of each ecclesiastical body situated in the different states, were cut asunder by political distinctions, which must turn brother against brother. Such a state of things would prevent all liberal intercourse among Christians, scattered over this land from north to south; and if, by renewing in America the local favouritism and the political priest craft of the old world, some particular clergymen might rise to a higher eminence, true religion would suffer by the change; and the more ingenuous and humble men, would become more limited in their influence and usefulness.
I would urge the support of the war, because I earnestly long for a permanent peace. You know the enemy. His claims will rise, by his successes; and fall, in proportion to his defeats. The more he suffers, the more will he be disposed to relinquish the contest. The greater his danger, the sooner will he come to an accommodation. By consistency and unanimity, America might have finished this war as soon as it had commenced. It is only by affecting the fears of the foe, that he can be made to listen to the voice of equity.
I would recommend the support of this war, because it is just. The United States ask for nothing, but what they ought to have; what it is lawful for the enemy to give; what is in its very nature moral—the protection of property, and personal liberty, I pray for success to these righteous claims: I pray for courage to the warrior, and for success to the armaments by which the plea is urged, because the cause is just—because it is necessary to the repose of the world—because God has promised that this cause shall universally prevail.
In offering these prayers, I know that they are in unison with the prayers of my brethren, even in the country with which this nation is at war—with the prayers of all Christians, who say, from the heart, “thy kingdom come.” I speak not of forms, dictated by courts, and used by the priests, whom the kings of the earth keep in pay to overawe their subjects. I speak of prayers, dictated by the Spirit of our Lord Jesus Christ. To such prayers, my petitions, for the ultimate success of the American claims, are in unison. Should you travel among the nations, and take the suffrages of the saints everywhere on earth, you would not find one single-hearted Christian, who would refuse his assent to these principles—the sea should he free to all honest enterprise—personal liberty should be secured—and every man should be permitted to pursue his lawful industry, wheresoever he chooses to take up his abode. These are the principles for which this nation contends by the sword; and therefore do I pray to the Almighty God, for their full success.—AMEN.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] To say of emigrants to the United States from Europe, that, in defending the rights of their adopted country against the injuries of their native country, they are guilty of treason, and deserve the punishment of traitors, is a perversion of principles and of language. Anything, that the ruling party, an unjust judge, and a packed jury, will choose to condemn under the government of Great Britain, may, for that purpose, be denominated constructive treason: but treason cannot be committed except by a traitor; and no man can be a traitor unless he betrays his trust. Injustice does not constitute a man a traitor, unless he has previously pledged himself to a certain course of conduct. Pontius Pilate was unjust towards our Lord Jesus Christ; but Judas Iscariot was a traitor. He who has publicly disclaimed allegiance to the king of England, cannot afterwards be a traitor to his majesty’s government; but he who has sworn allegiance to the United States, and afterwards serves the cause of the enemies of America, he, even he, is the man who betrays his trust, and is indeed the traitor to his country.
All civilized states act upon this obvious principle of morality. The subjects of one state residing in another, when war breaks out between them, are treated as enemies by the state in which they live; but not as traitors, because there was no trust reposed in them. It is not until they have acquired the rights of citizenship by naturalization that they can be guilty of treason.
Upon the self-same principle, those natives of Britain, who have left their country, and publicly disavowed their allegiance, cannot injustice he expected to retain it, and cannot of course either betray a trust towards the British government, or be guilty of treason against the King. All, who believe the correctness of the British claims, practically declare, that those men are deceivers, who, having been born in the British dominions, have become naturalized in America.
[2] “By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights. The place of birth produces no change in this particular—for it is not naturally the place of birth that gives rights, but extraction. Children born at sea—out of the country—in the armies of the state,—in the house of its ministers at a foreign court, are reputed native citizens. Every man, born free, may examine whether it be convenient for him to join in the society for which he was destined by his birth. If he finds that it will be of no advantage to him to remain in it, he is at liberty to leave it.” VATTEL. Sec. 216—220.
[3] “A nation may grant to a stranger the quality of a citizen, by admitting him to the body of the political society. This is called naturalization.” Vattel, Sect. 214.
[4] Notwithstanding this exclusive claim, of prohibiting emigration, and encouraging naturalization, as suits her own convenience, Great Britain gives to her subjects, those reasons which require the exercise of the natural and unalienable right of expatriation. She violates, in every instance, the PACT OF SOCIETY. 1. She does not afford to industry and enterprise, similar encouragement to that which is given in America. For the means of a comfortable subsistence, thousands are constrained to emigrate: others expatriate themselves, to improve a condition already comfortable; and a much greater number would follow the example, could they command the means of transportation to the hospitable shores of Columbia.
2. The British Government does not fulfil its obligations to the citizens, in governing them by equal laws. The scale upon which the representation is graduated, prevents freemen from giving their suffrages for those who make the laws: and they have of course, a right to remove to a country, in which society is organized upon more liberal principles.
3. Religion is violated, and pious men are placed under political disqualification, and forced to support a system of faith and worship, to which they cannot, as honest and good men, give their assent. To the corrupt establishment they are compelled to give the tithes of all.
A very large proportion of the population, and the most religious part of it too, in England and in Scotland, is among the dissenters from the national system of worship; and in Ireland, there is not probably one out of ten who belongs to the established church.
We have heard in this country, of the claims of Irish Catholics for emancipation; but the reason of rejecting their claim is not generally known. It is not from any dislike that the high churchmen have to the Roman religion; but from their hatred and fear of the Protestant dissenters. The watchmen of the political religion of England, now stand with the Sacramental Test in their hand, to guard the passage to power. The Independents, the Baptists, the Methodists, the Presbyterians, the whole body of Protestant dissenters, are the objects of opposition. The late bishop of London, Randolph, avowed his enmity; and threatened to suppress, all dissenters from the establishment, in his own diocese.
Is not this a reason for exercising the right of expatriation?
[5] See on this subject, Paley, Martens, Vattel, Bynkershock, Pauli, and Moser.
[6] There is some reason to hope, that the lime is approaching, when the principle for which I contend, will be in fact admitted as a part of the law of nations: not simply as it respects privateers; but also as it respects public armed vessels.
Privateering, I acknowledge, is more obviously wrong, than captures of merchantmen by national ships of war. It is that kind of the invasion of private right, which is most extensive in its injurious effects, most level to the capacities of ordinary minds, most calculated to excite the aversion of Christian sensibility, most pernicious to the general morality of the community, by multiplying the number of adventurers, who seek and share the plunder of unoffending fellow-men: but the evil, the radical evil, lies in the invasion of private right at all.
To the total abolition of this practice, I see in the state of the nations no formidable barrier, except what is presented by the policy of Great Britain. It is her navy that plays the criminal game in times of peace and war. It is reasonable, however, to expect, that during the present repose of the nations, they will ask one another the question, How long shall England be permitted to enjoy the exclusive commerce and dominion of the ocean? Shall it be forever? It is reasonable to expect they will devise means, in concert, for asserting the freedom of the seas.
I know that this is necessary to public justice. I know it is necessary to a permanent peace in the world. I know it is promised in the word of God. I know it will be brought to pass. In despite of the example, and the influence of Great Britain, I find throughout Europe and America, an increasing dislike to the practice of private plunder on the ocean.
Christian sensibility, in this city, and throughout the country, is averse from privateering. Some American civilians, and among others, MR. CHANCELLOR KENT of this state, (a man who, while Chief Justice, ably vindicated the Christian character of the commonwealth, in affirming the decision that blasphemy against the Saviour is a crime.) have protested against privateering. It would be doing injustice to their intellect and their patriotism, to say, that while condemning it here, they justify it on the part of the enemy, that, while condemning the practice of privateering, they approve of the principle of plunder by public armed vessels; that, while condemning the invasion of private right, as a weapon of war, they allow the morality of it in times of peace. I rather class them with those writers on public law, who, while they admit that it is among the usages of nations, desire to have the code of national law altered and amended. I rather class them with those distinguished civilians of France, who adorned the reign of the Emperor Napoleon, by raising up that imperishable monument of legal talent, the Civil Code, still the law of the nation whose throne he has abdicated. I had rather class them with the framers of the Treaty of Tilsit, that remarkable instrument, which, as we learn from the note of the Duke of Bassano, Paris, April 25, 1812, to the Chancellor of Russia, asserts the same principle. In that note are the following very liberal and correct assertions. “His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, has acknowledged at Tilsit, the principle—that the nations, in the full enjoyment of their rights, might give themselves up freely to the exercise of their industry—that the independence of their flag should be inviolable, and its protection a reciprocal duty of the one towards the other.”
AZUNI, on Maritime Law, adduces facts to show, that the nations in general, are approaching a state, in which the conventional code of public law will provide, That “in future no merchant vessel shall be stopped or seized, unless laden with articles really contraband:” and MARTENS gives to our own country, the credit of being first in this work of reform. “In the Treaty of Commerce between the king of Prussia and the United States of America, 1785, Art. 23, the first example has been given of a convention, in virtue of which, all merchant and trading vessels employed in the exchange of the productions of different places, shall pass freely, and without molestation.”