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SECTION XI.-On the Duty of Covenanting and the Permanent Obligations of Religious Covenants.

James Dodson

Q. What is a covenant?

A. A covenant in a mutual engagement between two parties, in which certain performances are stipulated on the one band, and certain promises on the other.

Q. Wherein does a covenant differ from a law, a vow, and an oath?

A. 1. It differs from a law in this, that it supposes mutual stipulations, while in a law there is no stipulation whatever, but simply the authority of a superior enjoining obedience on an inferior 2. It differs from a vow, inasmuch as, while a covenant supposes engagement on both sides, a vow supposes engagement on one side only; a person who vows engaging to perform some particular service without any promise being supposed to be annexed to the performance. 3. It differs from an oath; an oath being nothing more than a solemn appeal to God for the truth of some assertion that is made, without, as in a covenant, either an engagement to duty, or promise of reward. 4. In a covenant, then, there is engagement by two parties—in a vow there is engagement by one party only—in an oath there is no engagement at all.

Q. Does a covenant, whilst it differs from each, at the same time suppose the existence of a law, and include both an oath and a vow?

A. Yes. “A covenant proceeds upon the supposition of something being obligatory, and here is the idea of law. It implies an engagement to perform what is admitted to possess the obligation; and here is the idea of a vow. It supposes the covenanter to appeal to God with regard to the sincerity of his intentions, and here is the idea of an oath.”

Q. Are the terms covenant, vow, oath, used interchangeably to describe the same transaction?

A. Yes. According as one or other of these is designed to be prominently expressed, the same deed may be described by one or other of these terms.

Q. What does a covenant suppose in addition to the above definition, and as expressing a difference between a law, a vow, or an oath?

A. It supposes the promise of a reward which is not necessarily involved in any of the others.

Q. Are covenants either civil or religious?

A. Yes. 1. Civil, when entered into between man or society of men with respect to the affairs of this life. 2. Religious, when entered into between God and men with respect to the duties men owe to God, more especially religious duties.

Q. Are religious covenants either personal or social?

A. They are both. 1. Personal, when an individual engages, on the one hand, to keep the commandments of the Lord, and takes hold by faith, on the other, of God’s gracious promise. 2. Social, when a society engages with joint concurrence to perform certain duties, and to embrace with one heart the precious promises of Jehovah.

Q. Is it competent to any society, be it a family, a church, or a nation, to enter with common understanding and consent into a federal [i.e., covenanting] transaction?

A. Yes. And when this is done by a large corporate body, the transaction is called a public social covenant; which is the subject of consideration in this section.

Q. What is public social covenanting?

A. It is a solemn religious transaction in which men, with joint concurrence avouch the Lord to be their God, and engage, in all the relations of life, to serve him by obedience to his law, in the performance of all civil and religious duties in the confidence of his favour and blessing in the fulfilment to them of all his gracious promises. Deut. xxix. 10-13. “Ye stand this day all of you before the LORD your God; your captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel, Your little ones, your wives, and thy stranger that is in thy camp, from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of thy water: That thou shouldest enter into covenant with the LORD thy God, and into his oath, which the LORD thy God maketh with thee this day: That he may establish thee to day for a people unto himself, and that he may be unto thee a God, as he hath said unto thee, and as he hath sworn unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob.” Josh. xxiv. 1, 25. 2 Chr. xv. 9, 12, 15. Is. xix. 18. Jer. xi. 10.

Q. By what arguments can it be proved that public social covenanting is of divine authority, and so of moral obligation?

A. By numerous arguments. 1. The light of nature. The mariners of Tarshish, Jonah i. 16. “Then the men feared the LORD exceedingly, and offered a sacrifice unto the LORD, and made vows.” Epictetus, a heathen moralist, thus expresses himself: “To this God we ought to swear an oath, such as the soldiers swear to Caesar. They indeed, by the inducement of their wages, swear that they will value the safety of Caesar before all things; and will you, then, honoured with so many and so great benefits not swear to God or having sworn, will you not continue steadfast?” 2. Scripture precepts. Ps. lxxvi. 11. “Vow, and pay unto the LORD your God.” Jer. iv. 2. “And thou shalt swear, The LORD liveth, in truth, in judgment, and in righteousness.” Also xliv. 26, and Deut. x. 20. 2 Chr. xxx. 8. “Yield (give the hand) yourselves unto the LORD—and serve the LORD your God;” and Rom vi. 13, Mat. v. 33. “Thou shall perform unto the Lord thy oaths.” Rom xii. 1. 3. Scripture examples. Deut. xxvi. 15-19. “Thou hast avouched the LORD to be thy God—and the LORD hath avouched thee this day to be his peculiar people-that thou shouldst keep all his commandments.” xxix. 10-13. Quoted above, Josh. xxiv. 1, 25—“So Joshua made a covenant with the people that day,” &c. 2 Kings xi. 17. “And Jehoiada made a covenant between the LORD and the king and the people, that they should be the LORD’S people.” xxiii. 1,2; also, Neh. x. 29, &c.

Q. Is not covenanting a duty confined to ancient times, and not obligatory under the present dispensation?

A. As it is of moral obligation, it is consequently a duty incumbent upon present times; for things which are moral do not diminish in their obligation by the lapse of time.

Q. By what arguments can its obligation in New Testament times, be solidly proved?

A. By the following. 1. It was obviously a duty under the Old Testament dispensation, and being nowhere repealed, and being moral and not typical, it is of present obligation. Ps. lxxvi. 11, “Vow and pay unto the LORD your God.” 2. Scripture prophecies, evidently referring to New Testament times, and even yet to be fulfilled. Is. xix. 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, “In that day (the latter day) shall five cities in the land of Egypt speak the language of Canaan, and swear to the Lord of hosts,” &c, &c. Jer. iv. 4, 5. “In those clays (Millennial), and in that time, saith the Lord, the children of Israel shall come, they and the children of Judah together, going and weeping; they shall go and seek the Lord their God. They shall ask the way to Zion with their faces thitherward, saying, Come and let us join ourselves to the LORD in a perpetual covenant that shall not be forgotten.” 3. The New Testament recognises the obligation. Rom. vi. 13. Compare 2 Chr. xxx. 8, 2 Cor. viii. 5. The Macedonian churches, says Paul, “Not as we hoped, but first gave their ownselves unto the Lord, and unto us by the will of God.” Not in the Lord’s supper, which Paul certainly hoped they would do, but to his surprise, in a public social covenant. Rom. i. 31. “Covenant breakers” have a place in the catalogue of sinners, whose conduct is denounced as displeasing to the Almighty; which could not be the case, unless on the supposition of the continued obligation of covenanting. 4. It was one of the distinguishing privileges of the Jews to be in covenant with God. “I am married unto you, saith the Lord:” The privileges of the New Testament dispensation are increased and not diminished. Heb. xii. 18, 22. 5. This duty is involved in the church’s relation to God, as a married relation. Hos. ii. 19, 20; Eph. v. 30, iv. 25. Covenanting is only a solemn recognition of this relation, and engagement to evidence this by a life and conversation becoming the Gospel. Is. lxii. 4, evidently alludes, to New Testament times, and celebrates not only an ecclesiastical, but national marriage. By the marriage of a land unto God, we are not to understand that the trees of the forest, the mountains or plains come under engagements. Surely it must be the nation inhabiting the land. National marriage implies a national deed whereby the inhabitants, in their national capacity, solemnly covenant unto God. 6. The duty, when performed in its true spirit, is a source of unspeakable benefit, to a people; and, as nations seek the blessing, they should perform the duty. Ps. cxliv. 15, “Happy is that people that is in such a case; yea happy is that people whose God is the LORD.” Bound to God and he to them in “an everlasting covenant, not to be forgotten.”

Q. Have covenants a distinct intrinsic obligation peculiar to themselves?

A. Yes. Covenants possess an obligation distinct from God’s law. The covenanter is brought under an additional obligation to do the will of God. He is bound not merely by the naked authority of the divine word, but by his own voluntary act. “The covenant does not bind to anything additional to what the law of God contains, but it additionally binds—it superinduces a new and different obligation. As in the case of an oath. The obligation to tell the truth is universal and perpetual; but an oath brings the person who swears, under an additional obligation. Before he took the oath, if he deviated from the truth, he was guilty simply of lying; now he is guilty of perjury. Before, he violated only the authority of God; now he violates both the authority of God and the obligation of his oath.”

Q. What constitutes the formal reason of covenant obligation?

A. It is the personal act of the covenanter which constitutes the formal reason why a duty, when sworn to, is binding as a covenant duty, and not the obligation of the divine law, or morality of the act. “Were the morality of the duty the reason of covenant obligation, then all mankind would be formally covenanters, because the reason extends unto all, inasmuch as the moral law binds every man. Thus covenanting would be a mere cypher, and carry no obligation in it at all; for it does not affect the morality of the duty, that being the same before as after covenanting.”

Q. Are public social covenants of continuous obligation? or, are they binding upon the posterity of the original covenanters as long as the corporate body exists; or, until such time as the object for which they were framed has been accomplished?

A. They are and this position is sustained by forcible arguments. 1. We find posterity recognised in all the transactions between God and Jacob, at Bethel. Gen. xxviii. 13; compared with Hosea xii. 4. “He found him (Jacob) in Bethel, and there he spake with us.” 2. We have another remarkable instance of the transmission of covenant obligation to posterity in Deut. v. 2, 3. “The Lord our God made a covenant with us in Horeb. The Lord made not this covenant with our fathers (only) but with us, even us, who are all of us here alive this day.” 3. Another example occurs in Deut. xxix. 10-15; the covenant is here made with three descriptions of persons. 1. With those addressed adults. “Neither with you only.” 2. Minors. “Him that standeth here with us.” 3. Posterity. “Him that is not here with us this day”—for this could have no reference to any of the Israelites then in existence, as they were all present. It must, therefore, include posterity, together with all future accessions to the community. With them, Moses informs us, the covenant was made, as well as with those who actually entered into it, in the plains of Moab. 4. Another instance in which posterity is recognised in covenant obligation is found in Joshua ix. 15. This covenant was made between the children of Israel and the Gibeonites. Between four and five hundred years after that time, the children of Israel are visited with a very severe famine in the days of David. 2 Sam. xxi. 1. And it is expressly declared by the Lord that, “It is for Saul, and for his bloody house, because he slew the Gibeonites.” And at the same time, v. 2, that very covenant is recognised, and the breach of it is stated, as being the formal reason of the divine displeasure. Now, had it not been for this covenant, the extirpation of the Gibeonites would not have been imputed to Israel as a thing criminal; for they were comprehended in Canaanitish nations which God had commanded them to root out. 5. Posterity were charged with the sin of violating the covenant of their ancestors. Jer. xi. 10. “The house of Israel, and the house of Judah, have broken my covenant which I made with their fathers”—by which they are evidently considered as bound. 6. The principle of federal representation confirms this doctrine. Thus when Joseph made a covenant with his brethren, that they should carry up his bones from Egypt to the land of promise. He assumed that those whom he addressed, were the representatives of their successors, as he knew well that the whole of that generation should die before the deliverance of Israel by Moses. Posterity recognized the obligation. Ex. xiii. 19. A similar case of federal representation, is that of the Gibeonites quoted above. 6. Infant baptism is a forcible illustration of the continuous obligation of covenants. 7. The principle of the transmissibility of the obligations of covenants to posterity, is recognised by civilians in civil matters. In the obligations, for example, of the heir of an estate, for the engagements of his predecessor in the possession of it. All national treaties and other engagements of the corporate body, descend with all their weight upon succeeding generations.”

Q. Upon what is the principle in question founded?

A. “The principle in question is founded in the right which parents have to represent their posterity in certain social transactions. It is supposed in the continued identity of Society throughout successive generation. And it naturally enough follows from the Common interest, which children have along with their parents, in those objects for which federal deeds are framed. In this case representation springs, not from choice, as when men appoint their civil and ecclesiastical functionaries, but from the appointment of God, from a divinely authorized constitution-a constitution the existence of which is distinctly recognised when it is said, ‘Levi paid tithes in Abraham, for he was yet in the loins of his father when Melchizedec met him.’ Here the principle is clearly admitted by God himself.”

Q. What is the reason of this continuous obligation of covenants?

A. 1. God will have it so. 2. The permanency of the subject coming under the obligation. The church and nations are corporations existing and perpetuated in the succession of generations—one generation passeth away and another cometh—the succeeding coming into the obligations of the preceding—and God as a party to such deeds always exists. 3. The sameness of the relation to the moral Governor of the universe. The corporation and all its members are related God as moral subjects to a rightful sovereign. The duties being moral to which the covenant binds, by virtue of the moral relation of the corporate society to the Divine Sovereign in its successive generations, it is bound by the deed. 4. Obedience to God, according to his law, is a debt which no one generation can fully pay, and remains to each successive generation the same—hence the covenant obligation must be continuous. 5. Covenanting is a means of holiness—each successive generation needs to be sanctified, and consequently each successively needs this instrumentality—hence covenant obligation is transmitted with the stream of succeeding generations.

Q. Is not the principle of the transmissible nature of the obligation of public social covenants founded in reason and equity?

A. Yes. “The principle is this, that, when the matter of a covenant is lawful, and the parties continue to exist, the covenant itself retains its obligation until the object it contemplates has been gained. Thus a covenant between God and the church or between God and a nation, continues obligatory long after the original framers of it have been gathered to their fathers. The object contemplated may be a degree of Reformation hitherto unattained. The parties, too, must be held as continuing to exist, God the one party being the eternal God, and the church, or the nation, the other party, continuing in virtue of that identity which a corporate body possesses. This identity is not affected by the constant changes society may undergo as regards its individual members, just as the incessant changes which take place in the particles of the human body have no effect in destroying the personal identity of the individual.”

Q. Is not this principle of the continuously transmissible obligation of covenants highly advantageous in its tendency?

A. Yes. 1. “It strengthens that sense of gratitude to God by which men are stimulated to obedience, by leading the children to reflect on his goodness, in having regard to their welfare in the covenant made with their fathers, and comprehending them in the same federal transaction. Thus Peter reminds the Jews, Acts iii. 28, ‘Ye are the children of the prophets, and of the covenant which God made with our fathers.’ 2. It inspires confidence in the promised mercies of God, and affords ground to hope that he who has been gracious, in times that are past, to the fathers, will be gracious still to their children. Thus Moses encouraged the people of Israel. Deut. iv. 32: ‘He will not, forsake thee, neither destroy thee, nor forget the covenant of thy fathers, which he sware unto them.’ 3. It furnishes a powerful argument in pleading with God at a throne of grace, as we find it exemplified and confirmed in Jeremiah’s expostulation with God concerning the state of his nation; xiv. 22, ‘Do not abhor us for thy name’s sake; do not disgrace the throne of thy glory; remember, break not thy covenant with us.’ 4. It throws a shield over a people by which the wrath of God is averted. Lev. xxvi. 44, 45: ‘Yet for all that,’ says the Lord, ‘when they lie in the land of their enemies, I will not cast them away, neither will I abhor them to destroy them utterly, and to break my covenant with them, for I am the Lord their God. But I will, for their sakes, remember the covenant of their ancestors, whom I brought out of the land of Egypt.’ 5. It is not less fitted to keep up a remembrance of the wonderful things done by God on behalf of a people, by forming a record of them, and furnishing a medium for their transmission from generation to generation. Accordingly we find the command, 1 Chron. xvi. 12-15, ‘Remember his marvellous works that he hath done, his wonders and the judgments of his mouth,’ connected with the injunction, ‘Be ye mindful always of his covenant, the word which he commanded to a thousand generations.’ 6. Above all, it is eminently fitted, by begetting a delightful mutual interest between fathers and children, to promote and display the UNITY of the church. The fathers, by being required to transact for the children, and the children, by being required to recognise the deeds of the fathers, must be inspired with a double and most salutary interest in each other. All selfish and exclusive feeling is in this way rebuked. The present generation are taught to look back to the past, as the past are supposed to have looked forward to the future. Distant periods are united, and the interests of different generations concentrated.’ Jno. xvii. 11: ‘Holy Father, keep through thine own name, those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one as we are.’”

Q. Is covenanting a stated and ordinary, or occasional and extraordinary duty?

A. It is occasional and extraordinary.

Q. What are some of the times and seasons in which the church, or a nation, is called on to engage in this extraordinary yet important duty?

A. They are many and various. 1. Times of public humiliation for apostasy from God. Jer. l. 4, 5. 2. Times of affliction. Neh. ix. 1,38; 2 Chr. xxxiv. 29-32. 3. Times of public reformation. 2 Kings xxiii. 1-3. 4. Times of public thanksgiving for special deliverances. 2 Kings xi. 17-20; Ps. lxxvi. 11.5. When there is great lukewarmness and a tendency to backsliding. Dent. xxix. 10-15. 6. In view of severe conflict with the enemies of the truth, to consolidate and strengthen the Lord’s host. For example—Israel before crossing the Jordan. Ps. xliv. 3; Heb. xi. 32-38. So our Fathers—and now against the combined “armies of the aliens.” Rev. xix. 11. 7. Times of refreshing from the presence of the Lord. Is. xliv. 3-5. 8. When jealousies and contentions prevail, and there is a tendency to schism, covenanting will be a happy mode of “binding up the testimony”—which is in danger of being rent by schism.

Q. Are there not reasons forcibly urging the present performance of this duty?

A. Yes. There are many and forcible reasons. 1. The present is a time when reformation is demanded both in church and state. 2. A time of peculiar temptations to draw back. 3. A time of misunderstanding and misapprehension among professors. 4. A time when the faithful performance of the duty may operate as a means of conviction upon the enemies of truth. 5. A time of suffering. Neh. ix. 38; 2 Chr. xxxiv. 21, 31, 32. 6. A time in which it is necessary to revive the sense of covenant obligation, which has lamentably declined, and is very feeble in the hearts of professors.

Q. Has not God, in his providence, given us, in modern times, several interesting illustrations of this divine ordinance of covenanting?

A. Yes. 1. The existence of such federal deeds can be distinctly traced in the writings of Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and others of the early Christian fathers. 2. During the dark ages, the testimony of the Waldenses and of the Bohemian brethren to the practice can be easily adduced. 3. In more modern times it is well ascertained to have prevailed in all the Reformed churches of the continent—in Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (The league of Smalcalde, for example). 4. “The Pilgrim Fathers” employed this divine ordinance as a means of preserving the privileges of true religion among themselves, and of conveying them to their posterity. 5. But the examples in which we take the deepest interest., and in which we have the fullest embodiment of the principle in question, are those given in the British Isles; viz. The National Covenant of Scotland, and The Solemn League and Covenant of the three kingdoms.

Q. When and by whom was the National Covenant taken, and repeatedly renewed?

A. 1. At Edinburgh, on the 28th of July, 1581, the National Covenant was sworn. The National Covenant was sworn to by King James VI and his privy council, and soon after received the sanction of the general assembly of the church. Being cheerfully taken and subscribed by persons of all ranks throughout the land, under the direction of the constituted authorities, both civil and religious, it amounted to a Solemn national surrender of the kingdom to the Lord. 2. Afterwards, in 1590, when the liberties of the church were threatened by both domestic and foreign invasions, this celebrated bond was ratified anew, under the direction of two commissions, the one consisting of 96 ministers, the other of 130 of the nobility and gentry, who were authorized to obtain subscriptions; and with such success was this business executed, under the good favour of God, that in two years thereafter, an act, ratifying the liberties of the church, and settling the Presbyterian church government in Scotland, was obtained from the king and parliament. 3. This covenant, with some additional clauses, was sworn to with great unanimity and effect at the commencement of the second reformation, in 1638, “a step which was loudly called for by the insidious attempt then made to impose, by royal authority, the Book of Ecclesiastical Canons, and thus to blot out every vestige of the reformed religion and discipline from the land.”

Q. What was the substance of this interesting deed?

A. This deed formally abjured all the corruptions of the Popish system; expressed unequivocal attachment to the Confession of Faith, which, indeed, it comprehended; and embodied a clause in which the covenanters called upon God to witness the sincerity of their hearts in the solemn transaction.

Q. What was the occasion of the Solemn League and Covenant?

A. It was occasioned by the struggle maintained by an arbitrary and Popishly affected court against the friends of reformation and liberty in the British Isles.

Q. When was this celebrated deed prepared and taken?

A. 1. It was prepared by Alexander Henderson, received the approbation of the general assembly and the convention of estates, and was cordially subscribed by all persons of all ranks in Scotland, in the year 1643. 2. Having been deliberately examined by the venerable assembly of divines at Westminster, it was solemnly sworn in the church of St. Margaret’s Westminster by both houses of parliament, by the, assembly of divines, and by persons of different ranks generally throughout England. 3. In Ireland, too, it. was joyfully received by many of the Protestant population in the south, and by almost the whole body in the north; although, from the distracted state of things in that country, it could not possibly obtain the same legislative sanction as in the other two kingdoms. 4. This deed was formally and repeatedly ratified by parliament especially in 1644 and ‘49; and solemnly taken and subscribed by Charles II, both at Spey in 1650, and at Scoon in 1651, however perfidiously dealt by afterwards on the part of that royal hypocrite and traitor.

Q. What were the main objects of this famous deed?

A. These were “the preservation of the reformed religion in Scotland, and the reformation of religion in England and Ireland, and the bringing of the churches in the three kingdoms to the nearest conformity, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government.” The Covenanters bound themselves also to preserve the civil ruler’s “just power and authority,” in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdom.

Q. Is not, the second article of this instrument, in which it is said, “We shall endeavour the extirpation of Popery, prelacy, superstition, heresy, schism, profaneness, and whatsoever shall be found contrary to sound doctrine and the power of godliness,” chargeable with asserting persecuting principles?

A. There is nothing here which savours of persecution. There are certainly various methods of rooting out errors besides the anti-Christian one of putting to death the persons who hold them. “The clause makes no mention of persons, but of principles, as the subjects of extirpation; and surely to use all lawful means of ridding the world of such false and abominable evils as are there enumerated was not only innocent but praiseworthy. The heresies, not the heretics, were what the Covenanters had in view in the article in question.”

Q. Were not the Covenants enforced by “civil pains?”

A. This charge is founded upon the Act of Parliament, 1640, enjoining the subscription of the National Covenant. To this it is answered: 1. “This is no objection to the Covenants as such, but to those who, in an imprudent manner, undertook to promote their ends. 2. There is no evidence to prove that the subscription was not voluntary; but persons who had the best opportunities of knowing; have declared that ‘no threatenings were used, except of the deserved judgments of God, and no force except the force of reason.’ 3. Liberty to subscribe was withheld in the case of some, till there should be time to try their sincerity, and to prove that they acted from love to the cause, and not from the fear of maul. 4. Besides it ought to be borne in mind that these instruments have a civil, its well its religious object; and that, although the latter might not warrant the infliction of “civil pains,” the same restrictions did not apply to the former, and they ought, in candour, to be judged of in this complex character in which they were framed, enacted, sworn, and promoted. 5. Moreover, there is good reason to think that all that this vexed and startling phrase in the act in question was ever intruded to provide for was, that the covenants should be employed as tests of qualification for office, or proof of the candidate’s attachment to the Reformation. Exclusion from places of power and trust, it is believed, is all that can be proved ever to have been inflicted under this obnoxious act. The phrase, “under all civil pains,” when taken literally, and viewed by itself, may be deemed formidable looking enough, and calculated to call up, in the imaginations of the timid and the weak, the frightful ideas of fines, confiscations, imprisonments, executions, and similar “chimeras dire;” but when fairly interpreted, by the light of history, it dwindles very innocently into—“no seat in parliament.” 6. This is perfectly in conformity with the principle and practice of Israel’s best king. Ps. lxxv. 10. “All the horns of the wicked also will I cut off; but the horns of the righteous shall be exalted.” The horn is the symbol of civil power. David cut off the horns, but not the heads, of the wicked. He deprives them of civil authority, and conferred office upon the righteous only; for “the wicked (was his experience) walk on every side when the vilest men are exalted?” And such is the doctrine of the Covenanter.

Q. Is it not a valid objection to these deeds that, they improperly blend civil and religious matters?

A. “The cause in which the covenanters were embarked, the enemies by whom they were opposed, and the dangers by which they were surrounded, were of both kinds. They were necessitated, therefore, to frame their measures with a view to the removal of evils, and the accomplishment of ends, both of a religions and political character; they had to have respect at once to the interests of the church, and those of the civil community”

Q. Was not the taking of the covenants a most deliberate, solemn, and sublime transaction?

A. Truly so. “Nothing could exceed the affecting solemnity with which the national covenant was renewed in 1638; the powerful and pertinent prayer of Henderson; the impressive speech of Loudon; the reading of the document ‘out of fair parchment’ by Johnston; the death-like silence of the people that ensued; the sensation produced when the venerable earl of Sutherland stepped forward and appended his name first to the memorable deed; the rapidity with which it, afterwards circulated round the church to receive subscriptions; the eagerness with which they crowded round it, for the same purpose, when it was spread out like a prophet’s roll on flat grave-stones in the church-yard; the mingled expressions of joy and sorrow that rose from the crowd—joy at what the Lord had wrought, sorrow for personal and national sins; the shouts, the groans, the tears which succeeded; and above all the forest of right hands simultaneously uplifted in awful appeal to the searcher of hearts! These all bespeak deliberation as well as determination. Well might Henderson exclaim, ‘This was the day of the Lord’s power, wherein he saw his people most willingly offer themselves in multitudes like the dew-drops of the morning.’ The great day of Israel, wherein the arm of the Lord was revealed; the day of the Redeemer’s strength, on which the princes of the people assembled to swear allegiance to the king of kings—great, great was the day of Jezreel.”

Q. Was not the influence of these covenants highly beneficial?

A. Yes. God smiled on the work, and by the outpouring of his spirit gave the testimony of the divine approbation. Religion prospered, and the schemes of enemies were overthrown. ‘Now,’ said the Archbishop of St. Andrews, when he heard of the renovation of the national covenant, ‘now all that we have been doing these thirty years past is thrown down at once.’ ‘The Lord,’ says the author of the Fulfilling of the Scriptures, ‘the Lord did let forth much of the spirit on his people when this nation did solemnly enter into covenant in the year 1638.’ Many yet alive do know how their hearts were wrought on by the Lord. The ordinances were lively and longed after. Then did the nation own the Lord, and was visibly owned by him; much zeal and an enlarged heart did appear for the public cause; personal application was seriously set about; and then also was there a remarkable call of providence that did attend the actings of his people, which did astonish their adversaries, and forced many of them to feign subjection.’ ‘To what,’ adds Paxton, ‘to what must our great and lasting prosperity be owing? We believe it has been greatly owing to the covenants of our fathers, to which a faithful and gracious God has hitherto had respect. It was not the ocean that surrounds us; it was not the number and prowess of our fleets and armies, nor the wisdom of our councils (when invasion was threatened) but the sword of the Lord, and the buckler of his favour that saved us.’ Thus has God conferred a moral sublimity and wondrous prosperity upon the nations that bound themselves in these sacred bonds—‘covenants not to be forgotten.”

Q. Are not these covenants still obligatory upon the British Isles?

A. Yes. “The matter of these covenants, we have seen, was lawful, scriptural, reasonable; the objects contemplated by them all will admit, have not yet been attained, namely, the complete reformation of these lands, the extirpation of every anti-Christian and false system, and uniformity in doctrine, discipline, and government throughout the three kingdoms. The parties also still continue-the eternal and unchangeable God on the one hand, and the British nation on the other. Nations having a moral and even religious character, it must be admitted, are competent to enter into such solemn engagements; and those of which we speak were in every point of view national deeds; they were framed and concluded by the representatives of the kingdom; they were taken by the call and authority of those in power; they were sworn in a public capacity; they were ratified and confirmed by public legislative acts; the public faith was plighted by all the organs through which a nation is accustomed to express its mind and will. Sanctions less sacred; pledges less numerous and formal would have entitled another nation to demand from Britain the fulfilment of any treaty or contract; and shall not God who was not only a witness, but a party, nay, the principal party in these transactions, and whose honour and interests were immediately concerned, be regarded as having a claim to see that the stipulations are fulfilled?” ‘The identify of a nation’ says the venerable biographer of two most distinguished covenanters, ‘the identity of a nation, as existing through different ages, is, in all moral respects, as real as the identity of an individual through the whole period of his life. The individuals that compose it, like the particles of matter in the human body, pass away, and are succeeded by others, but the body politic continues essentially the same. IF BRITAIN CONTRACTED A MORAL OBLIGATION IN VIRTUE OF A SOLEMN NATIONAL COVENANT FOR RELIGIOUS REFORMATION, THAT OBLIGATION MUST ATTACH TO HER UNTIL IT HAS BEEN DISCHARGED. Have the pledges given by the nation been yet redeemed? Do not the principal stipulations in the covenant remain unfulfilled at this day? Are we not a people still bound by that engagement to see these things done? Has the lapse of time cancelled the bond? Or will a change of sentiments and views set us free from its tie? Is it not the duty of all the friends of the reformation to endeavour to keep alive a sense of this obligation on the public mind? But although all ranks and classes in the nation should lose impressions of it, and although there should not be a single religious denomination, nor even a single individual in the land to remind them of it, will it not be held in remembrance by ONE, with which a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years?”

Q. Does not great guilt rest upon the British nation for its treatment of these covenants, and for the blood of the covenanters?

A. Yes. A fearful weight of guilt. “It is matter of history, that after the restoration of Charles II., who himself had solemnly sworn these vows, acts were passed denouncing as treasonable and rebellious all the proceedings of the Second Reformation, rescinding all the public securities given during that period, stigmatizing the covenant as unlawful oaths, absolving men from their obligation, and declaring all laws passed in their favour to be null and void. It is also a well known fact, that under royal authority, the covenants were publicly burned by the hands or the common hangman, at London, in 1661, at Linlithgow the year following, and afterwards at Edinburgh. It is painful to be obliged to record, that, at the revolution in 1688, which extinguished the fires of persecution (consuming the adherents of the covenant), and put an end to the tyrannous rule of the Stuarts, nothing whatever was done, either by church or state, to make reparation for these atrocious indignities”—and the blood of the covenanters, which still stains the throne and nation. Now, when we consider that “one of the heaviest charges ever brought against the people of Israel was on this ground; they kept not the covenant of the Lord, and refused to walk in his law. For their heart was not right with him, neither were they steadfast in his covenant”—and the solemn declaration of the prophet of old, “I have been very jealous for the Lord of hosts, because the children of Israel have broken thy covenant”—and God’s own complaint, “The house of Israel, and the house of Judah, have broken my covenant which I made with their fathers”—how does it become the inhabitants of that covenant breaking land to ponder these words of Jehovah, If ye will not be reformed by me, but will walk contrary unto me; then will I walk contrary unto you, and will punish you yet seven times for your sins; AND I WILL BRING A SWORD UPON YOU THAT SHALL AVENGE THE QUARREL OF MY COVENANT. Wherefore hath the Lord done thus unto this land? What meaneth the heat of this great anger! Then shall men say, BECAUSE THEY HAVE FORSAKEN THE COVENANT OF THE LORD GOD OF THEIR FATHERS. Lev. xxvi. 23-25; Deut. xxix. 24, 25.

Q. May we not indulge the hope, that, in the goodness of our covenant God, and by the promised outpouring of his Holy Spirit, “the kingdoms of the world” at large, and the British empire in particular, will dedicate themselves to God in a covenant not to be forgotten-animated by the example of our covenant fathers exhibited in these memorable deeds?

A. Yes. We have the most cheering grounds for this blessed hope; for it is written, that the nations at large in the spirit of devoted loyalty, shall cry—COME AND LET US JOIN OURSELVES TO THE LORD IN A PERPETUAL COVENANT, THAT SHALL NOT BE FORGOTTEN: and it cannot be well doubted, that the death-cry of the martyred Guthrie has been heard on high, and shall be verified—THE COVENANTS, THE COVENANTS, SHALL YET BE SCOTLAND’S REVIVING.

[ON THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES TO THE GOVERNMENTS, WHERE REFORMED PRESBYTERIANS RESIDE, IN THE FORM OF A PRACTICAL TESTIMONY. ]

SECTION XII.-On the Application of these Principles to the Governments, where Reformed Presbyterians reside, in the form of a Practical Testimony.

James Dodson

Q. Under the government of what nations do Reformed Presbyterians reside?

A. They reside within the jurisdiction of the governments of the United States and Great Britain.

Q. Is the government of the United States, a government to which they yield allegiance, being in its constitution and administration the ordinance of God?

A. They do not yield allegiance to the government of the United States, but claim and exercise the right of dissent from its constitution, as an instrument of government having no claims to the dignity of being the Ordinance of God; but as immoral, and hostile to the kingdom of Jesus Christ.

Q. Upon what grounds do they state their dissent from the constitution of the United States?

A. In their testimony entitled “Reformation Principles” they declare, “There are moral evils essential to the constitution of the United States, which render it necessary to refuse allegiance to the whole system. In this remarkable instrument there is contained no acknowledgment of the being or authority of God. There is no acknowledgment of the Christian religion, or professed submission to the kingdom of the Messiah. It gives support to the enemies of the Redeemer, and admits to its honours and emoluments, Jews, Mohametans, Deists, and Atheists. It establishes the system of robbery, by which men are held in slavery, despoiled of liberty, and property, and protection. It violates the principles of representation, by bestowing upon the domestic tyrant who holds hundreds of his fellow creatures in bondage all influence in making laws for freemen proportioned to the number of his own slaves. This constitution is, notwithstanding its numerous excellences, in many instances inconsistent, oppressive, and impious.” Part I. p. 152.

Q. Is it indeed true, that this famous Constitution does not recognise the being or authority of God, or the regal authority of Jesus Christ, “the prince of the kings of the earth?”

A. It does not. If it did, the acknowledgment would be found in the PREAMBLE, which is as follows:—“We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the Common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.”

Q. Is there any recognition of the being and authority of God and his Christ in this part of this important instrument!

A. There is evidently not. The supreme authority is evidently that only of WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES; God and his Christ are not mentioned, nor the mediatorial supremacy recognised.

Q. But is not the being and authority of God recognised in the oath of office required of the President of the United States, in the words, “I do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States,” &c?

A. Not necessarily of the TRUE GOD. Because, 1. We learn from a member of the convention that framed the constitution, LUTHER MARTIN, delegate from Maryland, that the subject was debated in the convention, and the recognition refused. “The part of the system which requires that ‘no religious test’ shall ever be required as a qualification of any office or public trust under the United States, was adopted by a great majority of the convention, and without much debate. However, there were some members so unfashionable as to think that a belief of the existence of a Deity, and of a state of future rewards and punishments, would be some security for the good conduct of our rulers, and that, in a Christian country it would be, at least, decent to hold out some distinction between the professors of Christianity, and downright infidelity and Paganism.”—Genuine Information, p. 87. From this information it appears that the president may be all Atheist, according to the constitution, and the oath of office is, therefore, not a recognition of the being of a God, as his name is not mentioned in the form of the oath, and it contains no appeal to Him. 2. The Heathen swore by their Gods, but this was not a recognition OF GOD; nor is he pleased with such service. Jer. v. 7. “How shall I pardon thee for this? Thy children have forsaken me, and sworn by them that are no gods.” 3. As it was evidently intended that Atheists might hold office, by what God would they swear, who deny the existence of a Deity, and a future state of rewards and punishments?

Q. Does not the constitution recognise the Christian religion, and express its subjection to the kingdom of the Messiah?

A. It evidently does not. 1. From the above testimony of Luther Martin, that it was designed to hold out “no distinction between the professors of Christianity and downright infidelity and Paganism.” 2. From the 2d Sec. of Art. 6 in which it is declared, “This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all TREATIES made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, SHALL BE THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND.” In the treaty with “TRIPOLI, Mahometanism [i.e., Islam] is declared to be as much the religion of this nation as Christianity. “The Government,” says this “supreme law,” “of the United States IS NOT IN ANY SENSE FOUNDED ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. It has in itself no character of enmity against the laws or religion of Musselmen [i.e., Muslims].”—U. S. Laws, Vol. 4, Trip. Treat. Art. 2. Christianity—the laws of the Bible, are in no sense an element of the constitution. The supreme law is, THE WILL of WE THE PEOPLE, expressed in the constitution, laws, and treaties with foreign powers. The nation, as such, is INFIDEL. Yea, it is a nation without a God. Is. lx. 12. And the “justice” which they would “establish,” is not that which is founded upon that attribute of God, but that only which the will of “we the people” shall determine to be justice.

Q. Does the constitution give support to the enemies of the Redeemer, and admit to its honours and emoluments those who are adverse to his authority, religion, and laws, even Mahometans [i.e., Muslims], Deists and Atheists?

A. This is manifestly so; as a supreme law declares it is not in any sense founded on the religion of the Bible, and refuses, as a qualification for office, that the office-bearer should believe in the existence of a Deity, or a future state of rewards and punishments; as a consequence, infidels have occupied, and Atheists may occupy the highest seat in the gift of we the people. In contrast, the scriptures require, He that ruleth over men must be just RULING IN THE FEAR OF THE LORD.

Q. Is the Constitution of the United States a pro-slavery instrument?

A. Yes. It establishes that system of ROBBERY by which men are held in slavery, and despoiled of liberty and property.

Q. Is not this view of that instrument zealously disputed, and is it not attempted to be proved a strongly Anti-slavery document?

A. Yes. By a false and sophistical scheme of interpretation, an attempt is made to free the constitution from the guilt of being, in its true import, a slave-holding instrument.

Q. What are the legitimate rules of interpretation, by the application of which, the true import of a disputed document may be correctly ascertained?

A. The following are laid down by logicians and legitimate rules of interpretation. 1. “Whatever is obscure or doubtful in a covenant should be interpreted by the intention of the parties. If the intention of the parties does not appear from the words of the covenant, it should be inferred from the existing customs and usages of the place, in which it was made. If the words of the covenant contradict the well known intention of the parties, this intention must be regarded rather than the words.” 2. “When former interpreters are appealed to, in order to establish the sense of an ancient writing, those, caeteris paribus, should he preferred, who were nearest the author, in time or place, as his children, pupils, correspondents, or countrymen; and who had, therefore, better advantages for knowing his mind than more distant commentators.”—Hedge’s Logic, p. 167. By the application of these established rules of interpretation to the constitution, we will be able to ascertain its real character.

Q. Does not the preamble to the constitution, in which it is stated that the object of the instrument is to establish justice and secure the blessings of liberty to “we the people” and their “posterity,” prove the anti-slavery character of ‘the instrument?

A. By no means. The import of the preamble depends upon the just meaning to be attached to the phrase “We the people,” which cannot be justly interpreted as signifying any other than the free inhabitants of the land at the time the constitution was penned.

Q. Have you any proof that the slaves were not included in the phrase “We the people?”

A. Yes. Conclusive proof. 1. The people who ordained and established the constitution to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and posterity, were the same who were bound together by the feeble bonds of the old “articles of confederation,” which expressly declare, Art. iv., Sec. 1, “That the FREE INHABITANTS shall be entitled to the immunities of free citizens in the several states.” The free citizens of the several states were united by the ties of the confederation and these, finding those articles but “a rope of sand” to hold them together—and these only constitute WE THE PEOPLE, who ordained and established the constitution, to form a more perfect union, not with the slaves, but among themselves, as the free citizens; and to secure, not for the slaves, whom they then and afterwards held in bondage, but for themselves and their posterity, as then free, the blessings of liberty. 2. Not a slave had A VOTE (the prerogative of freemen), or cast a vote in the election of delegates to the convention which framed the constitution. That they so voted must be proved before they can be embraced in the phrase we the people. 3. Not a slave had the privilege of voting, or cast a vote in the election of delegates to the thirteen state conventions that adopted the constitution as the expression of the sovereign will of WE THE PEOPLE. This also must be proved in the affirmative, before the slaves can be included in the pompous phrase. 4. The inference is irresistible. THE FREE INHABITANTS of the land are WE THE PEOPLE; and it is not a constitution to secure the liberties of the slave, but of the already free, whilst it rivets the chains of the bondman. 5. When the constitution was ordained, and started on its career in the inauguration of Washington as the first president, the president himself was, at the time, A SLAVEHOLDER! and the groans and clanking of the chains of half a million of slaves mingled with the notes of the trumpet, the roar of artillery, and the shouts of “We the people” on that stupendous occasion! What a splendid mockery of justice and liberty!

Q. Have you any further proof of the pro-slavery character of this celebrated instrument?

A. Yes. Abundant. The first I adduce is Art. i. Sec 2. “Representatives and direct taxation Shall he apportioned among the Several states, which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.”

Q. Upon what in this passage does the argument hinge?

A. It hinges upon the just construction of the phrase, “three fifths of all other persons.”

Q. Is it not a just construction of this clause to represent it as signifying women, aliens, paupers, the tenants of almshouses, vagrants, &c.; for those who would evade its true import are not agreed upon a specific meaning?

A. All these constructions are illegitimate. 1. Women, aliens, and paupers are free persons, and are embraced in the census of population. 2. The phrase is not in the least ambiguous. It is as plain as any circumlocution call be. Take it in connexion with its context, and the laws of philological construction compel us to adopt the term slaves, as the only logical interpretation, and the true synonym of the phrase “all other persons:” for who are the opposite of “the whole number of free persons,” but those who are not free, namely, SLAVES? This stands nearest in the opposition to free persons, and legitimate construction constrains us to adopt the term. 3. This has been the uniform construction since the constitution went into operation, and sustained by this clause the slave-holding states have twenty-five representatives in Congress, based upon their slave population, more than they would be entitled to upon the basis of their free population!

Q. Have you any respectable authority in proof of this interpretation of the disputed clause?

A. Yes; highly respectable. BAYARD in his “Exposition of the Constitution” confirms this interpretation as the original intention of the clause. “In settling the ratio of representation, another difficulty arose, respecting the slaves who form so large a portion of the inhabitants of some of the states. To compute them among the numbers represented would be giving them an importance to which their character did not entitle them; or, rather, would be introducing a representation of property, contrary to the general tenor of the constitution; to omit them altogether in the computation would be to reduce the influence of the Southern States in a manner to which they would never consent. As a medium between these, it is agreed that five slaves should be accounted as three citizens, in arranging the representation, and the apportionment computed accordingly.”—P. 50.

Q. Have you any additional proof that this was the design of the clause when enacted and adopted as the supreme law of the land?

A. Yes. LUTHER MARTIN, a member of the convention that framed the constitution, and who therefore was fully possessed of its design, fully confirms the interpretation. “With respect to that part of the first article which relates to the apportionment of representation and direct taxation, there were considerable objections made to it, besides the great objection of inequality. It was urged that no principle could justify taking slaves into computation in apportioning the number of representatives a state should have in the government. That it involved the absurdity of increasing the power of a state in making laws for freemen in proportion as that state violated the rights of freedom.” Slaves, then, were the persons designed by the phrase “three-fifths of all other persons.” Thus the constitution “violates the principle of representation, by bestowing upon the domestic tyrant who holds hundreds of his fellow creatures in bondage, an influence in making laws for freemen proportioned to the number of his own slaves.”

Q. Was such the understanding of THE STATE CONVENTIONS which adopted the constitution?

A. Yes. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a delegate from New York to the convention that framed the constitution, and the only member from New York that signed it when completed, thus urges its adoption in the New York Convention: “The first thing objected to is the clause (three-fifths of all other persons) that allows a representation of three fifths of the negroes. Much has been said of the impropriety of representing men who have no will of their own: whether that is reasoning or declamation. (!) I will not presume to say. It is the unfortunate situation of the Southern States to have a great part of their population as well as property in blacks. The regulation complained of was one result of the spirit of accommodation which governed the convention and without this indulgence NO UNION COULD HAVE BEEN FORMED. But sir, considering some of the peculiar advantages which WE derived from them, it is entirely just they should be gratified. (! ! !) The Southern Slates possess certain staples—tobacco, rice, indigo, &c, which must be capital objects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations; and the advantages which they necessarily procure in these treaties will be felt throughout the United States.” Thus the spirit of compromise has erected SLAVERY a column to sustain the union of these states, and this column has for its impediment the United States Constitution! Hamilton certainly understood the meaning and intention of the clause “all other persons.” His interpretation is THREE-FIFTHS OF THE NEGROES! Yes, commercial speculation drowned in the bosom, even of an ALEXANDER HAMILTON, the sense of justice, and he and his compatriots did not hesitate to barter liberty for gold, and to strengthen and cement the union by the bondage and blood of the negro!

Q. Does not the venerable JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, contemporary with the framing, adoption, and administration of the constitution, confirm this interpretation?

A. Yes, fully. In his report, in the House of representatives, on the Massachusetts resolution, he thus comments on this clause: “In outward show it is a representation of PERSONS IN BONDAGE; in fact it is a representation of their masters—the oppressor representing the oppressed.”—“Is it in the compass of human imagination to devise a more perfect exemplification of the act of committing the lamb to the tender custody of the wolf?”—“The representative is thus constituted, not the friend, agent, and trustee of the person whom he represents, but the most inveterate of his foes.”—“If there be a parallel to it in human history, it can only be that of the Roman Emperors, who, from the days when Julius Caesar substituted a military despotism in the place of a republic, among the offices which they always concentrated upon themselves, was that of the tribune of the people. A Roman Emperor, Tribune of the people, is an exact parallel to that feature in the Constitution of the United States which MAKES THE MASTER THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SLAVE.” In the light of these contemporaneous expositions, we cannot in the exercise of sound judgment for one moment hold the clause under consideration as in the least ambiguous, but so well defined, understood, and so fully practised upon, that, a power has been reared legitimately upon it which overtops all other powers, and threatens the enslaving or destruction of the union. “Its reciprocal operation upon the government of the nation is, to establish an artificial majority in the slave representation over that of the free people, in the American Congress, and thereby to make the preservation, propagation, and perpetuation of slavery THE VITAL AND ANIMATING SPIRIT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.”—Adam’s Report.

Q. May we not array one part of the instrument against the other, the good parts, for example, against the bad, for the nullification of the hater?

A. By no means. It must be received as a whole and in all its parts. Neither can we separate the good from the bad—they are so interwoven that they must stand or fall together. We cannot construe it as wholly in favour of liberty; this would be to falsify the instrument. It is a compact in compromise with the slaveholder. He claims his part of the bond, and, if we sustain the instrument, WE MUST YIELD HIM HIS POUND OF FLESH, DRAW BLOOD WHERE IT MAY. It is, moreover, fearfully consistent with itself, liberty for “the whole number of free people,” bondage and degradation for “all other persons”—the WRETCHED NEGRO SLAVES.

Q. What other proof have you of the pro-slavery character of the Constitution of the United States?

A. A conclusive argument is found in Art. i., Sec. ix. “The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing may think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”

Q. What evidence is there that slaves are intended by the phrase “such persons” in this remarkable clause?

A. There is abundant evidence which cannot be fully gainsaid, because fully exhibiting the original design of this degrading clause.

Q. Are slaves, indeed, viewed as “persons” according to the letter and spirit of this clause?

A. American slavery, it is fully admitted, is all that the laws of the States declare it to be. The slave is “a chattel personal” in the hands of his owner; goods, a merchantable thing; yet, though marketable as a beast, and sold in the shambles as property, all this does not deny him to be a person; not free and independent, yet “an individual human being consisting of soul and body,” yea, “a man, woman, or child, as opposed to things, or distinct from them.” But a man, woman, or child, held as the property of another man, woman, or child, as the case may be. The slaveholder still views the slave as a human being, and will call it his MAN, POMP or CUFFY, his BOY Harry, his WOMAN Diana, or his GIRL Malinda. Take two advertisements as an example: 1. “FOR SALE.—Dick Morgan, a very honest, trusty servant, has acted as a porter in a grocery store for several years, and SPEAKS French and English.” 2. “Robert—possesses a first rate character in every respect.” These slaves are considered as men skilled in various employments requiring intellect, “souls,” so as to understand them; endowed with the gift of speech, and susceptible of moral culture, so as to be honest and to possess character. Now, who ever advertised a horse for sale as honest, a porter in a grocery store, and possessing a first rate character in all respects, and speaking the French and English languages? Negroes are viewed by slaveholders themselves as persons held as property. His personality is not destroyed, but his personal control as a “free person” is wrested and retained from him. He is considered a person as represented in Congress by his master; he is property as sold in the shambles: they are persons in the condition of slavery.

Q. What is the testimony of Bayard as an expositor of the constitution, as it respects the fact that slaves are solely intended by this clause of that instrument?

A. Bayard thus expounds the clause. Illustrating the limitation in the constitution of the powers of Congress, he remarks: “The first exception of this kind is that by which Congress is forbidden to prohibit ‘the migration or importation of such persons as any of the existing states should think proper to admit prior to the year 1808.’ The word ‘slaves’ is never mentioned in the constitution; the same sensibility on that subject then, as now, in the southern portion of the Union; but some of the politicians of that day thought the introduction of that unfortunate class, essential to the prosperity, if not to the existence of the southern states; and therefore would not consent to allow Congress to exercise the right they would otherwise possess, under time general power of regulating commerce, to put an immediate end to this inhuman traffic. The result was a compromise by which the power of Congress was restricted for a limited period.”

This is the language of an expositor of the constitution, who I learn from his advertisement to the second edition of his commentary, from which I quote, received by letter approbation “Chief Justice Marshall, Judge Story, chancellor Kent, and other distinguished jurists.” Now, what is the construction ratified by these distinguished jurists? Simply, the clause relating to slaves, and slaves only; and manifestly authorizes and sanctions the inhuman traffic in slaves for 20 years. This is obvious upon the least consideration. Without this clause Congress had and would have exercised the right to put an end to the African slave trade, as far as this country was concerned. But the WILL of WE the SOVEREIGN PEOPLE expressed in the constitution RESTRAINED Congress in the execution of this noble deed for 20 years. Therefore, the will of “we the people” expressed in the constitution SANCTIONED the FOREIGN SLAVE TRADE during that period. If they prevented its destruction by their will, which otherwise could or would have taken place, their will sustained the barbarous traffic.

Q. What is the testimony of LUTHER MARTIN upon this point?

A. His testimony upon this clause, as a member of the convention that framed the constitution, is as follows: "the design of this clause is to PREVENT the General Government FROM PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION OF SLAVES, but the same reasons which induced them to strike out the word ‘national,’ and not admit the word ‘stamps,’ influenced them here to guard against the word ‘slaves.’ They anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which might seem odious in the ears of Americans; although they were willing to admit into their system THOSE THINGS which the expressions signified.”

Q. What is the history of the celebrated compromise upon the subject of slavery, between the Northern and Southern States, which was adopted in the convention that framed the constitution?

A. LUTHER MARTIN gives the history of that odious transaction in the following words: “This clause,” the one under consideration, “was the subject of great diversity of sentiment in the convention; as the system was reported by the committee of detail the provision was general, that such importation SHOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED without confining it to any particular period. This was rejected by eight states—Georgia, South Carolina, and, I think, North Carolina voting for it.”

“We were then told by the delegates of the two first of those states, that their states would never agree to a system which put it in the power of the general government TO PREVENT THE IMPORTATION OF SLAVES, and that they, as delegates from those states, must withhold their assent from such a system.”

“A committee of one member from each state was chosen by ballot, to take this part of the system under consideration, and to endeavour to agree upon some report, which would RECONCILE those states. This committee, of which I also had the honour to be a member, met and took under their consideration the subject committed to them. I found the Eastern States, notwithstanding their aversion to slavery, were willing to indulge the Southern States, at least with a temporary liberty, to prosecute the slave-trade, provided the Southern States would gratify them in laying no restriction upon Navigation Acts; and after a very little time the committee, by a great majority agreed on a report by which the general government was to BE PROHIBITED FROM PREVENTING THE IMPORTATION OF SLAVES FOR A LIMITED PERIOD, and the restrictive clause to navigation acts was to be omitted. This report was adopted by a majority of the convention.”

Q. What is the point of this testimony of LUTHER MARTIN?

A. The point is this. That most infamous traffic, the slave-trade, was GUARANTEED by the constitution of the general government from 1787 until 1808, a period of more than 20 years. This was the direct and special design of this clause. In vain do men assert “it is a mere prohibitory clause—it authorises nothing.” What, if I by all oral, and especially by a written expression, of my will, prevent the prohibition of an evil practice, do I not thereby SANCTION that evil practice, and doubly so when by so doing I annul a right possessed by my agent to prohibit that practice? No man can rid himself of this conclusion.

The United States, government had the grant of the power to regulate the entire commerce of the Union already conferred upon the Congress, by which Congress would have had the right to abolish the slave-trade. This was torn from the hand of Congress by the nefarious deed, the compromise, enacted, as the will of “we the people” in this clause. Citizens of the United States, look at your own deed recorded in your national Constitution! “WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES ‘ORDAINED’ AND ESTABLISHED AS A CONSTITUTIONAL AND SUPREME LAW, THE PREVENTION OF THE PROHIBITION OR EVEN RESTRICTION OF THE MOST INFAMOUS TRAFFIC THAT EVER DISGRACED THE WORLD, THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE, AND THEREBY GAVE THE SANCTION OF OUR HIGH AUTHORITY TO ROBBERY AND PIRACY FOR 20 YEARS!”

Q. What is the testimony of the venerable James Madison as to the meaning of this clause?

A. James Madison, Fourth President of the United States, and Member of the Convention that framed the Constitution testifies in the debates in the Virginia Convention but adopted it-thus testifies to its true import. “The Southern States” (says Mr. M. upon this clause) would not have entered into the Union of America without THE TEMPORARY PERMISSION of that trade (the slave-trade). The gentlemen from South Carolina and Georgia argued in this manner: ‘We have now liberty to import this species of property, and much of the property now possessed, has been purchased or otherwise acquired in contemplation of improving it BY THE ASSISTANCE OF IMPORTED SLAVES. What would be, the consequences of hindering us from it? The slaves of Virginia would rise in value and we should be obliged to go to your market.’ Was there ever wickedness like this! To gratify the cupidity of a few Southern planters, a nation stoops to decree the “mischief” of the slave-trade, by a national Constitutional “law.” To grant “the temporary permission of that trade.” In vain will men reiterate the cry that the word “slave” is not in the Constitution, and therefore it is innocent of the guilt of slavery. THE THING IS THERE. The eyes of Omniscience are not blinded by the specious drapery of style with which crafty men may seek to disguise ‘iniquity’ in their recorded deeds. Yea, the veil is too thin to hide this iniquity from the eyes of the righteous man, when he opens his eyes upon it. He sees with the eloquent coloured man, that ‘slavery was in the understanding that framed the Constitution. Slavery is in the will that executes it.’”

Q. Does not the Act of Congress, 1808, enacted for the abolition of the slave trade, according to this clause, prove clearly that slaves only were meant by it?

A. Most conclusively. It was enacted to abolish the slave trade, which had been temporarily permitted by this clause of the constitution, and could not be restrained or prohibited until 1808, and which was, until this date, under the protection of the United States flag, in virtue of this guarantee of the constitution prosecuted with the utmost vigor; and thousands of African slaves were imported, and many of them, with their descendants still groan in bondage, the chains of which have been riveted by the U. S. constitution.

Q. Is there any other proof that the constitution sanctions slavery?

A. Yes. I adduce as another conclusive argument, Art. 4, sec. 2, 3: “No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.”

Q. Are slaves the “persons” here intended?

A. Yes. The slave, it has been already clearly shown, is esteemed both as “a person” and property; a person, when he can advance the dignity and augment the power of is master; property, when he can be subservient to the insatiable cupidity of his owner.

Q. Does the term “service” in this clause cover the office of slaves?

A. Yes.—The first meaning of service is “menial office.” “Menial” signifies “belonging to the train of servants.” Now, the term “servants” is a familiar term by which Southern men designate their slaves. They are sensitive, as Bayard declares, to the word “slave,” and hence avoided the use of the term in the constitution. In proof that “servants,” in Southern states, mean “slaves;” that these are there convertible terms, take the following advertisement:—“Valuable SERVANTS for SALE at auction, by Isaac L. McCoy. This day, Thursday, 27th instant, at 12 o’clock, at the Exchange Coffee House, will be SOLD, 34 valuable SERVANTS.”—(Anti-S. Man., p. 102.) Now, the term service expresses the menial office of a train servants; which whole train, amounting to 34, or any number, may be sold at auction, in the shambles of the South, as valuable servants. The clause contemplates, then, the “service” of Southern servants, or slaves.

Q. In what sense is the term “due” to be taken in this clause?

A. Every person, it is presumed, of the least legal intelligence, is familiar with the distinction between a claim in equity or a just claim, and a claim in law or a legal claim. No slaveholder can have a just claim to his slave, and his service, as his property, in a court of equity; but the law of the Southern states makes men slaves, and the will of the people contemplates in this clause the legal claim of the master, and determines to secure him the service of his, runaway slave, DUE to him in love, by compelling the delivering him up upon the claim of the master, when captured in a free state, to which he had escaped, as he supposed, as to a place of refuge.

Q. Can any person be held to service or labour, but a slave?

A. No. No contract service is compellable of performance. No contract compels a man to perform his promised service. The law holds him only in damages. Nobody is held to service under any contract he can make. If he does not perform what he promises, he is held to pay only; and not to be held then to the creditor. The creditor cannot hold him to pay. He has to ask the law to. He is not “held to service” to anybody. To “hold him to service” would itself make him a slave. The clause, therefore, means “slaves” only.

Q. Does not the phrase, “held under the laws,” prove the same point that slaves only are meant by the clause?

A. Very clearly. The constitution contemplates a class “held to service in a state under the laws thereof,” and says further, what it would not say of any persons but slaves, or any service but slave, service, that escaping from it into another state shall not discharge the person from it by virtue of any laws in that state. There is no service a person is holden to in any state under the laws thereof from which the laws of any other state would discharge him, generally, but slave service. We have slave states and non-slave states, but not pay states and non-pay states, contract states and non-contract states. The obligations of contract in one state are obligations on the debtor in all other states. But the constitution says there is a service under the laws of one state from which the laws of another state will discharge a person if he runs there. This service is no other than slave service; is that or none.

Q. Is any person liable by law to be delivered up to claimant but a slave?

A. No. No person is liable by law to be delivered up to a claimant but a slave; but the constitution speaks of delivering up to the claimant the person who owes the service by the laws of the slave states, but not by the laws of other states. Such a person must then be a slave. This can only be spoken of slaves, and anybody of whom it can be spoken, is a slave. If the constitution means anybody but the negro slaves, then it regards as slaves the white folks of this country. It is an enslaving instrument.

Q. Does not the law of Congress, 1803, illustrate this clause of the constitution, and prove that slaves only are meant?

A. Yes; conclusively. We quote the third section of the law, that this clause of the constitution and it may be compared: “And be it further enacted that when a person held to service for labour in any of the United States, or in any of the territories on the north-west or south of the river Ohio, under the laws thereof, shall escape into any other of the said states or territories, the person to whom such labour or service may be due, his agent or attorney is hereby empowered to seize or arrest such fugitive from labour, and to take him or her before any judge of the circuit or district courts of the United States, residing or being within the state, or before any magistrate of a county, city or town corporate, wherein such seizure or arrest shall be made and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit, taken before, certified by a magistrate of any such state or territory, that the person so seized or arrested, doth, under the laws of the state or territory, from which he or she fled, owe service or labour to the person claiming him or her, it shall be the duty of such judge or magistrate to give a certificate thereof to such a claimant, his agent or attorney, which shall be sufficient warrant for removing the said fugitive from labour to the state or territory from which he or she fled.” All admit this law to be a slave-catching law, and nothing else. Yet the word slave is not in it, but its phraseology describing the persons designed in it, is the exact phraseology of the clause in the constitution. If the one is slave-catching, so is the other; for the slave-catching law is the legitimate offspring of the enactment in the constitution; and the only design of the law was to arrest and carry back into bondage the fugitive, and for this purpose only has it been administered ever since its enactment. The constitutionality of this, law has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in the late case of Puff vs. Pennsylvania, and from this decision there is no appeal. It must abide THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND.

Q. What proof have you that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is final in this and similar matters, and that from its decision there is NO APPEAL?

A. Bayard, in his exposition of the constitution, thus declares the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. “The judicial power of the Union is declared to extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution (Const. Art. iii. sec. 2, 1), and to the judicial power it belongs whenever a case is presented before it, to determine what is the supreme law of the land. And this power, in the last resort, is vested by the constitution in the Supreme Court of the United States. And its decision must be final and conclusive; because the constitution gives to that tribunal, power to decide, and has given, no appeal from its decision.”—P. 122.

Q. What is the decision of this ultimate tribunal relative to the import and original design of this clause of the constitution respecting fugitives from service?

A. Its decision demonstrates the pro-slavery character of the clause, and is as follows: In one of the decisions JUDGE STORY said, “Historically it is well known that the object of this clause was to secure to the citizens of the slave-holding states THE COMPLETE RIGHT AND TITLE OF OWNERSHIP IN THEIR SLAVES AS PROPERTY, IN EVERY STATE OF THE UNION into which they might escape from the state wherein they were held in servitude.” “The full recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of property, in all the slave-holding states, and, indeed, was so vital to the preservation of their interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it constitutes a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union would not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against the doctrines and principles prevalent in the non-slaveholding states, by preventing them from intermeddling with, or restricting, or abolishing the rights of owners of slaves.”

Again. “The clause was therefore of the last importance to the safety and security of the Southern states, and could not be surrendered by them without endangering their whole property in slaves. The clause was therefore adopted in the constitution by the unanimous consent of the framers of it. A proof at once of its intrinsic and practical necessity.”

Again. “The clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive unqualified right on, the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation can in any way regulate, control, or restrain.”

JUDGE BALDWIN, in charging the jury, said, “If there are any rights of property which can be enforced—if one citizen have any rights of property which are inviolable UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE SUPREME LAW OF THE STATE AND THE UNION, they are these which have been set at naught by some of these defendants. As the owner of property which he had a perfect right to possess, protect, and take away, as a citizen of a sister state, entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of any other state—Mr. Johnson stands before you on ground which cannot be taken from under him; it is the same ground upon which the government itself is based. If the defendants can be justified, we have no longer law or government.” Again, after referring more particularly to the provision for delivering up fugitive slaves, he said, “Thus you see that the foundations of the government are laid and rest on the right of property in slaves. THE WHOLE STRUCTURE MUST FALL BY DISTURBING THE CORNERSTONE.” Thus slavery is a CORNER-STONE of the government— a column in the temple of liberty!

Q. How does Bayard interpret this clause?

A. “This provision,” says Bayard, “relates to that class of men who are held in bondage in some of the States, and are sometimes tempted to escape into the non-slaveholding states, in the hope of regaining their freedom by that means. These states might be induced, by views of humanity, or other motives, to shelter the fugitives and throw obstacles in the way of their recovery. This, if allowed, would be a constant source of dissension between the states, and might lead to the most serious consequences. The holding of slaves is a domestic concern with which other states ought not to interfere, and as long as it is permitted in any of the states, the peace of the country requires that the rights of the masters should be respected. This, therefore, is a wise provision. Without it, the Southern states would, probably, not have consented to the union.”

Q. What is the opinion of James Madison, who, of all men, had the best opportunity to know, as to the legitimate construction of this clause?

A. Thus this celebrated man delivered his opinion upon this clause in the Virginia convention for the adoption of the constitution: “Another clause secures us that property which we now possess. At present (under the old confederacy) if any slave elopes to those states where slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by their laws; for the laws of the states are uncharitable to one another in this respect. But in this constitution ‘no person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to which such service or labour may be due.’ THIS CLAUSE WAS EXPRESSLY INSERTED TO ENABLE OWNERS OF SLAVES TO RECLAIM THEM. This is a better security than any that now exists.” Thus plainly speaks a member of the Convention that framed the constitution, and by whose arguments in its illustration, the Virginia convention is influenced to adopt it.

Q. What says General Randolph as to its true meaning?

A. He thus briefly delivers his opinion as a member both of the United States and Virginia conventions. “Every one knows that slaves are held to service or labour; and when authority is given to vindicate their property can they (the owners of slaves) be deprived of it?”

Q. Does not this clause, therefore, sanction, by all the force of the supreme law, the odious sin of slavery?

A. Of this there can be no doubt in the impartial mind. The clause was “EXPRESSLY INSERTED” to give a power not before possessed to owners of slaves TO RECLAIM THEM—to “give them authority to vindicate their property.” This is full sanction of slavery—the strongest ratification of the alleged rights of the master. Ah! I go not to the panders of immoral power and the worshippers of an idol for a just answer to the inquiry—Is not this sanction? But go to the slave—go to yonder weeping one, who thought he had escaped to a city of refuge, but by the authority of this clause of the United States constitution is now seized, reclaimed, rebound, to be dragged back to the land of chains, and whips, and horrid gashes in the flesh, and iron yokes with spikes, applied in the “tender mercy” of that personification of the dignity of human nature, the overseer! Ask this wretched being as he writhes under the torture inflicted because he dared to assert his rights in the attempt to regain his liberty, ask him if this is sanction?—and raising his manacled hands to heaven, in the agony of a bursting heart, he will exclaim—YES, this is sanction, I FEEL IT TO BE SANCTION!

Q. Is not the fugitive slave law of 1850, a further illustration of this pro-slavery clause of the Constitution?

A. Yes. An ample and fearful illustration.

Q. What is its substance?

A. Its Substance is in a principal clause contained in Sec. 4. This clause makes it the duty of the commissioners, appointed by the act to adjudicate in the matter, “to grant certificates to such claimants upon Satisfactory proof being made, with authority to take and remove such fugitive from service or labour, under the restrictions herein contained, to the state or territory from which such persons may have escaped or fled.” It is a fearful restoration of the peremptory injunction of the constitution—the fugitive shall be delivered up upon claim of the party to whom such service or labour is due.

Q. Have you any additional evidence of the sanction of slavery by the constitution of the United States?

A. I have-and adduce Art. iv, sec. 4th; and Art, i. sec. 8 . By the former, “every state in this Union is guaranteed protection by the United States, ‘against domestic violence.’” By the latter, “Congress is empowered ‘to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections and repel invasions!” These provisions, however strictly they may apply to cases of disturbance among the white population, were adopted with reference to the slave population, for the purpose of keeping them in subjection by the combined military force of the country; and were these repealed, and the South left to manage her slaves as best she could, a servile insurrection would ere long be the consequence, as general, as it would be unquestionably successful.

Q. What evidence have you of the correctness of this interpretation of these clauses?

A. 1. James Madison. He says, respecting these clauses, “On application of the legislature or executive, as the case may be, the militia of the other states are to be called to suppress domestic insurrections. Does this bar the states from calling forth their own militia? No, but it gives supplementary security to suppress insurrections and domestic violence.” 2. In answer to Patrick Henry’s objection, as urged against the constitution in the Virginian convention that there was no power left to the states to quell an insurrection of slaves, for it was wholly invested in Congress, GEORGE NICHOLAS asked, “Have they it now? If they have, does the constitution take it away? If it does, it must be in one of these clauses which have been mentioned by the worthy member. The first gives the general government power to call them out when necessary. Does this take away from the states? No. But it gives additional security; for besides the power in the state government to use their own militia, it will be the duty of the general government TO AID THEM WITH THE STRENGTH OF THE UNION WHEN CALLED FOR.” 3. LUTHER MARTIN testifies to the same point. “It was further urged (in argument against the pro-slavery features of the constitution), that by this system of government, every state was to be protected both from foreign invasions, and domestic insurrections; that from this consideration it was of the utmost importance it should have a power to restrain the importation of slaves, since in proportion as the number of slaves were increased in any state, in the same proportion the state is weakened, and exposed to foreign invasion and domestic insurrection, and by so much less will it be able to protect itself against either; and therefore will by so much the more be a burden to the union.”

Q. Has not this view of these clauses been exemplified—and is it not demonstrated that they are the stronghold of slavery?

A. Yes. This solemn guarantee of security to the slave system, caps the climax of national barbarity, and stains with human blood the garments of all the people. In consequence of it, that system has multiplied its victims from five hundred thousand to nearly three millions—a vast amount of new territory has been purchased in order to give it extension and perpetuity-several new slave states have been admitted to the union—the slave trade has been made one of the articles of commerce— the slave population, though over worked, starved, lacerated, branded, maimed, and subjected to every form of deprivation, and every species of torture, have been overawed and crushed; or, whenever they have attempted to gain their liberty by revolt, they have been shot down and quelled by the strong arm of the national government; as, for example, in the case of Nat Turner’s insurrection in Virginia, when the naval and military forces of the government were called into active service. Cuban bloodhounds have been purchased with the money of the people, and imported and used to hunt slave fugitives among the everglades of Florida. A merciless warfare has been waged for the extermination and expulsion of the Florida Indians, because they gave succour to these poor hunted fugitives—a warfare which has cost the nation several thousand lives, and forty millions of dollars—and the late war with Mexico was waged, unquestionably, to extend the area of slavery.

Q. Have you any additional argument demonstrating the national sanction of slavery?

A. Yes. I adduce Art. i. sec. 8, clause 8. “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” Bayard, on the Constitution, says, “The exclusive regulation of commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes, is also confided to Congress. This was obviously proper, as the management of all concerns with foreign nations, and a general superintendence over domestic affairs, constitute the peculiar province of the national government, and were the principal objects of its establishment,” p. 49. Slaves are an article of commerce among different states. The domestic slave trade is therefore under the general superintendence of the national government. It regulates this part of domestic affairs as its “peculiar province.” The domestic slave-trader is protected in this “infamous traffic” by “the stripes and stars.” The stars of freedom shine with a benignant lustre upon the domestic slave-ship, as she ploughs the ocean with her burden of woe; but they emit no ray of gladness to cheer the bosom of the helpless tenants of her hold.

Q. Has not Congress the right to abolish the domestic slave trade?

A. This is exceedingly doubtful. Mr. Madison says, “No power is given to the general government to interfere with respect to the property in slaves now held by the states.” The constitution views the slave as property, as proved above, and authorizes the slaveholder to vindicate his property—in a free state. Now all property may be sold, and therefore become an article of commerce. It would seem a just conclusion, that the slaveholding states have a constitutional right to traffic in slave property among themselves—the inter-state slave trade is constitutional-and Congress, whilst it has a right to regulate, would seem to have no right, without the consent of the slaveholding state, to abolish this nefarious and inhuman traffic.

Q. Does not the amendment to the constitution, which is in these words, “Nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” prove the constitution to be an anti-slavery instrument?

A. By no means. The only one of these three possession which the slave can at all be said to possess, is life; yet, his living energies are his master’s. If he forfeits his life—and in the slave states in more than 70 ways he may do so—he has always, until Judge Lynch erected his tribunal, been deprived thereof by “due process of law.” But liberty and property he legally possesses not. “He can possess nothing, nor acquire anything,” says the slave code, “but what must belong to his master.” This was his condition when this amendment was enacted, and has been his condition ever since. It was never enacted for him. How will you undertake to deprive a man of that of which he is not possessed? The slave has neither liberty nor property, and you cannot deprive him of either by “due process of law,” or otherwise. How common sense breaks the meshes of the web of subtleties?

Q. Is not this provision of the constitution, compelling the delivering up of the fugitive slave to his master, from whose tyranny he had escaped, a direct violation of the law of God?

A. Yes. It is a direct violation, Deut. xxiii. 15, 16. “Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee: he shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best: thou shalt not oppress him.”

Q. What action has the Reformed Presbyterian Church taken upon American slavery?

A. She has made it a term of communion. Her decision is, “No slaveholder is admitted into her communion.” Test, part i. p. 155. The resolution of the committee of presbytery sent to the South to purge the church of this evil, is in the following terms: “Resolved, That enslaving these our African brethren is an evil of enormous magnitude; and no one who continues in so gross a departure from humanity and the dictates of our benevolent religion, can have any claim to communion in this church.”

The following note was sent to each individual implicated in this enormous evil.—“Sir: You are hereby informed that none can have communion in this church who hold slaves. You must therefore immediately have it registered legally that your slaves are freed, before the ensuing sacrament. If any difficulty arises to you in the manner of doing it, then you are desired to apply to the committee of Presbytery, who will give directions in any circumstances of a doubtful nature in which you may be involved in carrying this injunction into execution.”

In her Testimony, part ii. pp. 119 and 152, she emphatically denies “That a constitution of government which deprives unoffending men of liberty and property, is a moral institution to be recognised as God’s ordinance;” and declines allegiance to the United States Government, because “It establishes that system of robbery by which men are held in slavery, despoiled of liberty, and property, and protection. It violates the principle of representation, by bestowing upon the domestic tyrant who holds hundreds of his fellow creatures in bondage, an influence in- making laws for freemen proportioned to the number of his own slaves.”

Q. Will not God “judge and avenge” the blood of the slave upon such a nation as this?

A. As God is just he will: what he did to the oppressors of old he will do now. “Thus saith the Lord: even the captives of the mighty shall be taken away, and the prey of the terrible be delivered: for I will contend with him that contendeth with thee, and I will save thy children, and I will feed them that oppress thee with their own flesh ; and they shall be drunken with their own blood as with sweet wine, and all flesh shall know that I am the Lord thy Saviour and thy Redeemer, the mighty one of Jacob.” “Arise, O Lord, for the oppression of the poor, for the sighing of the needy, and set him in safety from him that presseth at him.” “Arise, oh sovereign Judge of the nations, judge the fatherless and the OPPRESSED, THAT THE MEN OF THE EARTH MAY NO MORE OPPRESS.”

Q. Is there not some evidence in the Signs of the times that God is now judging this nation, and will ere long deluge it with blood?

A. Yes. The signs of the times indicate that the prophecy of John Quincy Adams may soon be fulfilled. “The delegates,” said that distinguished man, “of the free states (in the national convention), in their extreme anxiety to conciliate the ascendancy of the Southern slaveholders, did listen to a compromise between right and wrong—between FREEDOM and SLAVERY, of the ultimate fruits of which they had no conception, but which already, even now, is urging the Union to its inevitable ruin and depopulation, by a civil, servile, foreign, and Indian war, all combined in one; a war, the essential issue of which will be between freedom and slavery, and in which the unhallowed standard of slavery will be the desecrated banner of the North American Union—that banner first unfurled to the breeze inscribed with the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence.”

[APPLICATION OF THE TESTIMONY TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE]

APPLICATION OF THE TESTIMONY TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

James Dodson

Q. What is the present position of the Reformed Presbyterian Church in the British Isles, in relation to the civil institutions of those kingdoms?

A. It is that of avowed dissent, and of faithful testimony against the immoralities in the civil constitutions of those kingdoms.

Q. Upon what ground did the steadfast band of witnesses for the covenanted reformation in Scotland, adopt the position of dissent from the civil government of these lands, as well as from the churches which were at once established and corrupted by it?

A. The extreme tyranny of the government then in existence was only one of the grounds on which they rested that dissent. They further complained, that the government was erected on the ruins of a scriptural reformation, to the preservation of which these nations were solemnly bound: that the ecclesiastical were the mere creatures of the State; and that the principles and the policy of the great Romish apostasy were so conspicuous in the constitution and administration of both church and state, as to stamp the whole with the character of Antichrist.

Q. Were matters altered much for the better at the memorable revolution [i.e., of 1690, the ascension of William and Mary to the British throne]?

A. At the revolution, these nations adopted and acted upon the views of the covenanters in regard to the first ground of complaint only. The tyrannical government was indignantly overthrown, and one of a much more equitable and moderate character was substituted in its stead. But while the public spirit and energy of the nations were displayed in shaking off the yoke of oppression, and in asserting their own rights, no effectual attempt was made to vindicate the rights of the Redeemer. The covenanters were not ungrateful for the large increase of liberty and privilege secured to them by the revolution; but they could not accede to an arrangement, however beneficial to themselves, of which these were made essential conditions: That the crown rights of the Messiah should be compromised, and the antichristian corruptions interwoven with the constitution, both of church and state, should remain undisturbed.

Q. What is the first specific exception which Reformed Presbyterians in Britain take to the British constitution?

A. In their own language, they explicitly state as their first objection to the British constitution, That there is no direct or explicit acknowledgment of the supreme authority of the scriptures in the constitution and administration of civil government in these lands. In the actual administration of the government of these kingdoms, it seems to us that this principle has been practically disregarded. It does not appear that the responsibility of nations to the moral governor of the world is fully understood or felt. No strenuous attempt has heretofore been made, by almost any class of society, to select men possessing scriptural qualifications to occupy the halls of legislature, or to fill public offices; and it has rarely occurred, we believe, that any course of policy has been abandoned, merely because it was condemned in the word of God. Here we rest our first complaint, that the authority of Jehovah is virtually set aside, while the homage and allegiance of the nations have been tendered to the great idol of POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY.

Q. What is their second ground of dissent?

A. At no period, say they, since the revolution, have these nations and their rulers formally acquiesced in the divine decree which has invested the exalted Messiah with the government of the nations: “Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth; serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way.” We know of nothing, either in the deeds of constitution, or in the administration of the government of these kingdoms, which can justly be regarded as a proper acquiescence in this authoritative appointment. There is no formal recognition of the supremacy of Christ, as Mediator, over the nations; no acknowledgment of those vows of allegiance that were formerly pledged to him in the period of the Reformation; no care employed to make the interest of his kingdom the primary object of concern. The favour that has been extended to churches in these lands has been manifestly vicious in its principle, and has tended to corrupt these churches, rather than to advance the cause of religion.

Q. What is the third ground of this dissent?

A. With these evils may be conjoined the open and arrogant invasion of Christ’s supremacy over his church. He has solemnly commanded his disciples to own no other master. He claims the exclusive right of prescribing a government and laws to his church; and there is not a single hint in the sacred volume of his having appointed an ecclesiastical viceroy to whom he has delegated his own authority. The usurpation of such a dominion constitutes one of the highest charges against the Man of Sin. Yet according to the statute laws of the empire, an Erastian supremacy over the churches of England and Ireland is held to be an essential right of the British crown.

Q. What evidence is there of this unhallowed claim?

A. “The king,” says Blackstone, and of course the queen, too, “is considered by the laws of England as the head, and supreme governor of the national church.” The Papal jurisdiction in England was destroyed by Parliament upon the express ground that “the king’s majesty justly and rightly is, and ought to be, supreme head of the church of England.” The first of Elizabeth enacts that, “all jurisdictions, spiritual and ecclesiastical, should forever be united to the imperial crown.” And in her 37th Article, the church endorses the impious claim. It runs thus: “The king’s majesty hath the chief power in this realm of England, unto whom the chief government of all the estates of this realm, whether they be ecclesiastical or civil, IN ALL CAUSES, doth appertain.” Thus do both church and state agree in declaring it to be a fundamental principle of the constitution, that the king or queen is supreme head in all causes civil and ecclesiastical. A more grossly unscriptural element, therefore, has been introduced into the church of England than is to be found in that of Rome. In the fearful impiety in making a sinful mortal head of the church, indeed, both have concurred; but then the head of the church of Rome must be an ecclesiastic, and a man—female popes are not esteemed quite canonical—whereas the head of the church of England is a lay or civil person; and may be a man, a women, or a child ! ! ! Her erastianism, therefore, is emblazoned on her very forehead.

Q. Has a copious stream of erastian encroachment flowed from this polluted fountain of royal supremacy?

A. Yes. Her clergy, for instance, have all their authority to rule and ordain from the sovereign. In 37 Henry VIII. cap. 17, it is declared, that “archbishops, bishops, archdeacons, and other ecclesiastical persons, have no manner of jurisdiction ecclesiastical, but by, under, and from his royal majesty; and that his majesty is the only supreme head of the church of England and Ireland.” Words could not more explicitly declare that instead of having their authority from the Lord Jesus Christ, these dignitaries derive it immediately from a poor erring mortal. Hence, also, the clergy cannot meet in convocation, or enact anything, or perform any act of ecclesiastical discipline, without her majesty’s authority and permission; and the appointment of all bishops belongs to the sovereign, &c, &c.

Q. Does the power of the state to model and remodel, to overturn and reconstruct the church at pleasure, to decree rites and ceremonies in her, to form canons for the regulation of her government, to select the persons who shall fill all her most important offices, and even to determine her confession and creed, therefore remain undisputable?

A. Yes. All this is evident from the above statutory enactments.

Q. Is it not at once repugnant to religion and to common sense, that the church of Christ should be thus subjected to the arbitrary will, or caprice, of a legislative assembly, composed of Protestants and Papists, of Christians and libertines, of sincere believers and scoffing infidels, and in which the enemies of religion so greatly outnumber her friends?

A. Yes; and every upright Christian should bear testimony against such enormity.

Q. What is the fourth ground of dissent of Reformed Presbyterians in Britain from the British constitution?

A. The support that has been extended by the state to the church, however munificent, has been so managed that the cause of true religion has been more injured than promoted by it.

Q. How is this charge sustained?

A. It is sustained, 1. By the fact that this support has been lavished most abundantly on those Protestant churches which have been most inefficient and corrupt: and even in them it has been employed to pamper luxury and gratify ambition, while a large portion of those ministers by whom pastoral duties were actually performed, have been left to struggle with poverty, and multitudes of the people to perish through lack of knowledge. 2. It has invariably been used as an instrument for reducing the church into a condition of political subserviency. The revenues of the church have been dealt with as a spoil, which civil rulers have distributed among their political partisans and supporters. They have been employed to sustain a lordly aristocracy, rather than to feed the people with the bread of life. They have largely contributed to silence the voice of faithful remonstrance, which it is the duty of the church to raise against the iniquitous measures of public men, and to influence the clergy to inculcate upon the people lessons of indiscriminate and slavish submission, whatever aggressions have been made upon their liberties—civil or religious. 3. The mode of levying the revenues of the church, both in England and Ireland, has been unhappily calculated to excite odium against her and her ministers, and to call into exercise a class of passions exceedingly unfavourable to the progress of the gospel. 4. The principle upon which that bounty has been bestowed upon the churches is essentially corrupt and vicious. In all the measures of government respecting the church, we have searched in vain for any higher principle than political expediency as the prime mover. It is impossible to believe that an enlightened regard to the authority of God, a discriminating love of divine truth, an earnest desire for the promotion of true religion, can dispose a government to patronize every system of religion—be it true or false. Yet it does not appear that the British government, since the Revolution, have ever withheld its fostering care from any religious system, merely on the ground of its falsehood. Presbyterianism is conceded to the inclinations of the people in Scotland; Episcopacy, more in favour with men in power, is established in England and Ireland, and more richly endowed than any church in Europe. But when a wretched expediency seems to require it, Popery is taken under the fostering care of government in the Ionian Isles; its corrupting seminary at Maynooth magnificently endowed; successive companies of its priests directly supported from the public treasury, sent out to propagate its destructive errors in the British colonies, and it is honoured with a legal establishment in Lower Canada! Nor is the climax of inconsistency and iniquity complete, until the functionaries of a Protestant government are degraded into tax-gatherers for the wooden gods of Hindostan, and the priests of a debasing and bloody superstition!

Q. Which is the fifth ground of their dissent?

A. In the domestic policy of these nations, there are many things which awaken regret and merit reprehension. While millions have been expended in destructive wars, the education of the people has been neglected. Until a very recent period, this has been lamentably the case both in England and Ireland. An irreligious government, and an ambitious and pampered church, have looked on with equal apathy, while successive generations have grown up in the grossest ignorance. In England a revenue has been expended annually on cathedrals and on the swarms of idle ecclesiastics that, are attached to them, which, under judicious management, might have secured the education of all the poor in that kingdom. From the extensive prevalence of ignorance has arisen a most frightful growth of infidelity and of crime. How little has been done to check the alarming progress of the national sin of Sabbath profanation? With this may be joined the apparent apathy with which government has contemplated, from age to age, the dreadful ravages of intemperance. The views we have adopted of the office and duty of witnesses, imperatively called for-these remarks.

Q. What is the general summary which these witnesses give of the reasons of their dissent from the British constitution?

A. They remark: The guilt and danger of holding-fellowship with the principles, or the policy of the Antichristian system-with the head or the horns of the beast-are represented in Scripture as of such magnitude, that no temporal loss nor suffering can counterbalance them. (Rev. xvii. 3, 12, 13.) Under these impressions, we cannot proclaim attachment, nor vow allegiance to institutions which many good men extol and admire:—1st. Because, in viewing them by the light of scripture, we believe them to be immoral. 2d. Because we hold them to be Antichristian. 3d. Because they were erected on the ruins of a more excellent system, both in church and state, and in opposition to those solemn vows, by which these nations were pledged to preserve that system inviolate. 4th. Because the immoralities of existing institutions were originally introduced, and are still upheld, in opposition to the clearest light of revelation with which any people were ever favoured.

Q. In what manner do these witnesses illustrate practically their dissent?

A. This explanation of our sentiments, say they, will supply the reason why we do not adopt those forms of prayer for the government of these lands, which are publicly prescribed, or commonly used throughout the churches. We fully recognise the obligation that lies on us, to pray for the peace and prosperity of the land that sustains, and for the temporal and spiritual welfare of all classes of its inhabitants. Towards the persons of the rulers we cherish no feeling but that of unfeigned good will. Our heart’s desire and prayer to God for them is that they may be saved. But we cannot warrantably employ forms of prayer that would even seem to express approbation of institutions which we believe to be essentially defective and immoral. We cannot pray for the stability of a system which, as long as it is unreformed, is dishonouring to Christ, and an impediment to the coming of his kingdom. The same reasons are still more cogent to forbid our being incorporated or united with the state, so as to become accomplices in, or morally responsible for, its iniquitous public policy. Such as are in ecclesiastical fellowship with us, cannot, without a breach of their testimony, hold fellowship with the civil’ government, by composing a part of the legislature, or by taking those oaths, for the maintenance and defence of the complex constitution, which are required of members of Parliament and others filling public offices, both in church and state. And as the members of our church cannot sit in Parliament themselves, neither can they, consistently, sit there by their representatives, or commission others to do for them what it would be unwarrantable and immoral for them to do in their own persons. Neither can they compose a part of the executive government, by holding offices under the crown, civil or military, which might require them to cooperate in carrying into practice any branch of an unscriptural code of law. Yet we do not feel debarred from doing what may be in our power, as private individuals, for strengthening those wholesome laws which are necessary for the security of life and property, or for promoting the administration of justice, when permitted to do so without being identified with a corrupt constitution. Should these principles -subject us to the charge of uncharitableness or want of patriotism, we would study to confute the charge by the blamelessness of our deportment, and by a life of active benevolence.

[CONCLUSION]

 

CONCLUSION.

James Dodson

Q. Will not Christ’s mediatorial dominion cease “when he shall have delivered up the kingdom (1 Cor. xv. 24, 27, 28) to God, even the Father,” when he shall have judged the world at the last day?

A. The passage referred to relates to the account which the Mediatorial King shall render to the Father of his administration of the kingdom of providence with which he had been invested—but his mediatorial dominion shall not then cease, but he shall continue for ever to rule as Mediator—as the Father’s delegated king, because only in his character of Mediator can the SON (the Father’s equal, essentially, in power and glory) “be subject unto the Father.” As the Father’s Mediatorial servant, therefore, he shall reign over the kingdom of heaven for evermore in fellowship with his saints—for “if we suffer with him, WE SHALL REIGN WITH HIM.”

Q. How do you prove that his Mediatorial dominion will be perpetual or eternal?

A. That his Mediatorial dominion is ETERNAL is proved by many arguments, of which we advance but two. 1. Scripture declarations. Dan. vii., “His dominion (the Son of Man’s—Christ’s) is AN EVERLASTING dominion, which SHALL NOT PASS AWAY, and his kingdom that which SHALL NOT BE DESTROYED.” Luke i. 33, “HE SHALL REIGN OVER THE HOUSE OF JACOB FOR EVER, AND OF HIS KINGDOM THERE SHALL BE NO END.” 2 Peter i. 11, “An entrance shall be ministered to you abundantly UNTO THE EVERLASTING KINGDOM of our Lord and Saviour JESUS CHRIST.” 2. His title KING OF GLORY. This title belongs to Christ, for he is called, 1 Cor. ii. 8, “THE LORD OF GLORY, who was CRUCIFIED.” James ii. 1, “Have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the LORD OF GLORY, with respect of persons.” To him then applies the sublime title employed in a psalm which celebrates his ascension—THE KING OF GLORY. He who reigns over the state of heavenly felicity, as the regulator and dispenser of the joys of celestial bliss FOR EVER AND FOR EVER. Myriads of angelic heralds, as they demand admission for him within the portals of the celestial palace, shout, “Lift up your heads, O ye gates; and be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors; and the King of glory shall come in.” And when the question is propounded, “Who is this King of glory?” they meet it with the unhesitating response, “The Lord of Hosts, HE IS THE KING OF GLORY.” Psa. xxiv. 7-10.

THE END.

 

Preface.

James Dodson

1853-James M. Willson.-This preface explains the importance of the subject matter for the consideration of Christians together with a a denounciation of the doctrine of passive obedience to civil rulers.

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Conclusion.

James Dodson

1853-James M. Willson.-Willson concludes by asserting the right and duty to apply Scriptural principles to the US Constitution and its outworkings with a firm belief that the principles of the Bible will ultimately prevail. 

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Appendix.

James Dodson

1853-James M. Willson.-This contains a series of observations on certain Greek words and phrases taken from various authors in support of Willson’s views.

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Introduction.

James Dodson

1841-James M. Willson.-An brief explanation of the cause for researching and writing on the topic of the deacon together with an apology for the present work.

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Chapter 3.-Of Substitutes for the Deacon.

James Dodson

1841-James M. Willson.-In this chapter various schemes which undermine the diaconate and its role in the life of the church are examined, particularly "boards of trustees" and their antipathy toward many of the things deacons are appointed to do and preserve in the church.

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